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ABSTRACT 
This Article provides the first legal examination of the immensely 
valuable but underappreciated phenomenon of social innovation. 
Innovations such as cognitive behavioral therapy, microfinance, and 
strategies to reduce hospital-based infections greatly enhance social 
welfare yet operate completely outside of the patent system, the primary 
legal mechanism for promoting innovation. This Article draws on 
empirical studies to elucidate this significant kind of innovation and 
explore its divergence from the classic model of technological innovation 
championed by the patent system. In so doing, it illustrates how patent law 
exhibits a rather crabbed, particularistic conception of innovation. Among 
other characteristics, innovation in the patent context is individualistic, 
arises from a discrete origin and history, and prioritizes novelty. Much 
social innovation, however, arises from communities rather than 
individual inventors, evolves from multiple histories, and entails 
expanding that which already exists from one context to another. These 
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attributes, moreover, apply in large part to technological innovation as 
well, thus revealing how patent law relies upon and reinforces a rather 
distorted view of the innovative processes it seeks to promote. Moving 
from the descriptive to the prescriptive, this Article cautions against 
extending exclusive rights to social innovations and suggests several 
nonpatent mechanisms for accelerating this valuable activity. Finally, it 
examines the theoretical implications of social innovation for patent law, 
thus helping to contribute to a more holistic framework for innovation law 
and policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), a set of psychological techniques 
for combatting depression, anxiety, and other conditions, has lifted 
millions of people from the depths of mental illness. Microfinance, the 
practice of making small, unsecured loans to indigent borrowers, has 
helped move significant numbers of individuals out of poverty. Changes to 
physician attire—such as not wearing neckties—have substantially 
reduced the incidence of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
(MRSA) infections in hospitals, saving thousands of lives every year. 
Although these developments are quite different, they all share two 
important characteristics. First, they reflect immensely valuable “social 
innovations” that apply new ideas and practices to address pressing social 
problems. Second, they all arose completely outside of the patent system, 
the primary legal mechanism for promoting innovation. 
Although the Constitution authorizes a patent system “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts,”1 entire swaths of useful arts fall 
outside the domain of patent protection. This Article extends beyond 
patent law’s traditional focus on technological innovation to consider a 
broader conception of social innovation and how legal mechanisms may 
(or may not) encourage it. Social innovations are immensely important yet 
understudied;
2
 innovations as diverse as emissions trading, kindergarten, 
and nationalized healthcare have literally transformed society.
3
 This 
 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2. Geoff Mulgan, The Process of Social Innovation, 1 INNOVATIONS, Spring 2006, at 145, 146; 
Geoff Mulgan et al., Social Innovation: What It Is, Why It Matters, and How it Can Be Accelerated 5 
(Skoll Ctr. for Soc. Entrepreneurship, Working Paper 2007) (“Surprisingly little is known about social 
innovation compared to the vast amount of research into innovation in business and science.”); 
Michael D. Mumford, Social Innovations: Ten Cases from Benjamin Franklin, 14 CREATIVITY RES. J. 
253, 262 (2002). 
 3. Mulgan, supra note 2, at 145; see also James A. Phills Jr. et al., Rediscovering Social 
Innovation, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Fall 2008, at 34, 40 (listing charter schools, community-
centered planning, emissions trading, fair trade, habitat conservation plans, individual development 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Article seeks to explore this significant kind of innovation as well as its 
divergence from the classic model of technological innovation 
championed by the patent system. Additionally, it proposes various 
strategies to accelerate social innovation. Finally, it considers the 
theoretical implications of social innovation for patent law, thus helping to 
contribute to a more holistic framework for innovation law and policy. 
At a descriptive level, this Article represents the first legal examination 
of the immensely valuable but underappreciated phenomenon of social 
innovation. While acknowledging the inherent difficulty of defining social 
innovation, this Article shows how innovations such as CBT, 
microfinance, and strategies to reduce MRSA infections are “social” in 
that they serve public objectives, are intended for wide application, and 
involve changes to human behavior and relationships. It also compares and 
contrasts social innovations with other domains of “innovation without IP” 
that have attracted significant scholarly attention, from academic science 
to the fashion industry.
4
  
In exploring social innovation, this Article highlights and challenges 
the narrow, particularized conception of innovation embedded in patent 
law. Among other characteristics, innovation in the patent law context is 
individualistic, discrete, novel, and objectively reproducible. Much social 
innovation, however, arises from communities rather than individual 
inventors, emerges from multiple histories, entails expanding existing 
practices, and faces significant challenges of reproducibility. This Article 
further argues that notwithstanding patent law’s particular conception of 
innovation, these dynamics often apply as well to processes of 
technological development traditionally protected by the patent system. In 
applying its narrow and particularistic conception of innovation, patent 
law thus obscures and rewrites the innovative processes it seeks to 
promote.  
Before proceeding, several terminological and methodological notes 
are in order. First, this Article uses the term “innovation” rather than 
“invention” to describe novel creations that serve social needs. Traditional 
patent parlance distinguishes between “invention,” which refers to creating 
a new technology, and “innovation,” which entails all of the processes of 
developing that technology into a commercial product.
5
 However, within 
 
 
accounts, international labor standards, microfinance, socially responsible investing, and supported 
employment as examples of social innovations). 
 4. See infra notes 60–67 and accompanying text.  
 5. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1038–39 (1989). 
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the literature on social innovation, the term “innovation” intrinsically 
encompasses not just the creation of a new idea but its implementation. 
The term “invention,” thus has little meaning in the social innovation 
context, for ideas without practical application have no social value. 
Second, this Article focuses primarily on social innovations rather than the 
entrepreneurs who champion them or the enterprises that give them 
institutional form.
6
 While this Article will certainly address social 
entrepreneurs and enterprises, its emphasis on the innovations themselves 
will offer the cleanest comparison to the inventions that fall within the 
realm of patent protection. Third, although this Article focuses on social 
innovation, it posits no sharp distinction between this field of creativity 
and more traditional forms of technological innovation protected by the 
patent system. Indeed, this Article argues that underlying innovation 
dynamics are often generalizable across many overlapping contexts. As 
such, labels signifying “social” and “technological” innovation reflect 
differences of emphasis and degree rather than fundamental differences of 
kind. 
Turning from the descriptive to the prescriptive, this Article proposes 
several mechanisms for accelerating social innovations. In so doing, it 
helps fill a significant gap in the literature, for “[w]hile national strategies 
abound to support innovation in business and technology, no comparable 
strategies at the national level exist to understand and support social 
innovation.”7 In so doing, it draws upon a rich body of scholarship 
comparing the relative merits of exclusive rights, public funding, prizes, 
and other inducement mechanisms to promote innovation.
8
 Although it 
argues against extending formal intellectual property rights to social 
innovations, this Article applies several IP-related insights for promoting 
such innovation. In particular, it argues that public and private funding, 
robust social capital markets, and strengthened infrastructure can 
significantly accelerate social innovation. It further draws from the theory 
of the firm to suggest organizational strategies for spreading social 
innovations, and it argues for harnessing the power of user innovation and 
commons-based peer production to promote this valuable activity. In 
reciprocal fashion, this Article shows that social innovation has much to 
 
 
 6. Charles Leadbeater, Social Enterprise and Social Innovation: Strategies for the Next Ten 
Years 6 (Office of the Third Sector, Working Paper, 2007) (“Should the focus of policy be on social 
entrepreneurs (a type of person), social enterprise (a type of organisation), social innovation (an 
activity or process) or social impact (a goal or outcome)?”). 
 7. Mulgan, supra note 2, at 147. 
 8. See infra Part III. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
6 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:1 
 
 
 
 
teach policy makers about accelerating more traditional types of 
technological innovation. In particular, it argues that technology law and 
policy should focus more on fostering communities of creativity, 
providing productivity-enhancing infrastructure, and funding not just 
invention, but the implementation, replication, and extension of existing 
technologies. 
At a theoretical level, this Article advances two related critiques of the 
patent system in laying a foundation for a more holistic innovation law 
and policy framework. First, it argues that patent law reflects—and 
scholarly discourse has adopted—a rather crabbed, narrow conception of 
innovation. Patent law’s pervasive focus on discrete inventorship, novelty, 
and traditional categories of technology neglects other significant 
expressions of human ingenuity. Although semiconductors and 
pharmaceuticals are clearly valuable (and other patentable technologies, 
such as improved toilet seats, may not be), strategies to combat 
homelessness or reduce childhood malnutrition certainly are as well. And 
while the former receive significant policy attention and public subsidy 
both within and outside of the patent system, the latter do not.  
Second and relatedly, this Article advances a distributive critique of an 
innovation framework that is heavily based on markets.
9
 According to 
classic patent theory, patents help resolve market failure in the production 
of technology by providing rights to exclude.
10
 Among its other virtues, 
the patent system is often extolled as a neutral platform in which the 
market—rather than a government entity—determines the allocation of 
resources for technological development. But markets are not neutral 
platforms; they ration access to technology based on ability to pay rather 
than other potential criteria. As commentators have long observed, a 
market-based, “efficient” allocation of resources may correlate with a high 
degree of distributive inequality.
11
 In addition, markets not only apply 
 
 
 9. Historically, IP scholars have primarily asserted distributive critiques in the context of 
international intellectual property law. See generally Keith Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic Motives in 
Intellectual Property Law (with Special Reference to Coercion, Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 717 (2007); Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 
92 CALIF. L. REV. 1331 (2004); Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2821 (2006). However, domestic innovation law and policy is also subject to such 
critiques. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual 
Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 978 (2012); Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons 
in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917 [hereinafter Lee, Distributive Commons]. 
 10.  See Lee, Distributive Commons, supra note 9, at 928. 
 11. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 5 (1960); Chon, supra note 9, at 
2832 (“Over-reliance on utility-maximization ignores distributional consequences.”). Of course, in 
addition to not prioritizing distributive equity, market-based allocations are not necessarily efficient, 
either. See Kapczynski, supra note 9, at 978–79. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss1/5
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value-laden criteria to select who gets existing innovations, they also 
determine the kinds of innovations that society develops in the first 
place.
12
 Quite simply, markets select for innovations that are valued in 
markets.
13
 Thus, even assuming an effective patent system that provides 
robust exclusive rights, a market-based framework for driving innovation 
will not adequately address the needs of the poor and underprivileged. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I explores the 
underappreciated phenomenon of social innovation. It describes several 
factors that characterize innovations as “social,” illustrating them through 
empirical case studies of CBT, microfinance, and strategies to reduce 
hospital-based MRSA infections. Part II then compares social innovation 
with patent law’s conception of protectable innovation. Whereas patent 
law views protectable innovation as individualistic, discrete, and novel, 
much social and technological innovation is communal, difficult to 
demarcate with clear boundaries, and is not strictly new. Part III turns to 
prescriptions and explores mechanisms for enhancing social innovation. It 
cautions against extending exclusive rights to social innovations and draws 
on comparative institutional analysis to argue in favor of public and 
private funding as well as strengthened networks, incubators, and 
organizational strategies to accelerate such innovation. It also draws upon 
the literature on user innovation and commons-based peer production to 
suggest mechanisms for promoting this valuable activity. Part IV builds a 
foundation for a more holistic innovation law and policy framework. It 
first shows how efforts to promote technological development would 
benefit from several insights arising from social innovation, including 
greater emphasis on communal creativity, infrastructure, and 
implementing, replicating, and extending existing technologies. 
Furthermore, it argues for pluralizing the values served by innovation law 
and policy and addressing distributive needs that are neglected by market-
based allocation. 
 
 
 12. See Kapczynski, supra note 9, at 978 (“In an IP system, price influences not only who has 
access to such goods, but also which goods are produced in the first place.”). 
 13. Leadbeater, supra note 6, at 12 (“Markets will often not address the needs of the hardest to 
reach, poorest consumers, especially those with special needs because there is no profit to be made 
from serving these consumers.”); see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., FOSTERING 
INNOVATION TO ADDRESS SOCIAL CHALLENGES 9 (2011) [hereinafter OECD, FOSTERING 
INNOVATION] (“Market processes and the ‘invisible hand’ are, even more than in other innovation 
activities, inefficient to co-ordinate these innovation activities that aim directly to address social 
challenges.”); cf. Brett M. Frischmann, The Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2143, 2160 (2009) 
(arguing that patents can influence university research systems to produce outputs that are responsive 
to markets). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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I. SOCIAL INNOVATION 
A. Characterizing Social Innovation 
Part of the challenge of analyzing social innovation entails defining 
what that term means. Various definitions abound,
14
 and the category of 
“social innovations” can be so capacious as to encompass developments as 
diverse as the emergence of mass media, feminism, private property rights, 
the International Monetary Fund, and the Boy Scouts.
15
 This Article does 
not provide a bright-line definition of social innovation, and it questions 
whether a crisp definition exists.
16
 Rather than offer a categorical 
definition, this Article contends that the “social” nature of an innovation is 
a question of degree dependent on several factors. This Article 
characterizes innovations as “social” based on the degree to which they 
 
 
 14. See OECD, FOSTERING INNOVATION, supra note 13, at 13 (“‘Social innovation’ itself is 
manifold and its definition is hardly consolidated nowadays.”); Eduardo Pol & Simon Ville, Social 
Innovation: Buzz Word or Enduring Term?, 38 J. SOCIO-ECON. 878, 881 (2009) (“Generally speaking, 
no agreed definition of ‘social innovation’ exists.”); see, e.g., OECD, FOSTERING INNOVATION, supra 
note 13, at 13 (“Social innovation refers to a group of strategies, concepts, ideas and organizational 
patterns with a view to expand and strengthen the role of civil society in response to the diversity of 
social needs (education, culture, health).”); S. Barley, Editor’s Note, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., 
Spring 2003, at 1, 1–2 (defining social innovation as “the process of inventing, securing support for, 
and implementing novel solutions to social needs and problems”); Mulgan, supra note 2, at 146 
(“Social innovation refers to innovative activities and services that are motivated by the goal of 
meeting a social need and that are predominantly diffused through organizations whose primary 
purposes are social.”); Mumford, supra note 2, at 253 (“The term social innovation, as used here, 
refers to the generation and implementation of new ideas about how people should organize 
interpersonal activities, or social interactions, to meet one or more common goals.”); Phills Jr. et al., 
supra note 3, at 36 (“[W]e redefine social innovation to mean: A novel solution to a social problem 
that is more effective, efficient, sustainable, or just than existing solutions and for which the value 
created accrues primarily to society as a whole rather than private individuals.”) (italics removed); 
Julia Gerometta et al., Social Innovation and Civil Society in Urban Governance: Strategies for an 
Inclusive City, 42 URB. STUD. 2007, 2007 (2005) (defining social innovation with reference to “the 
satisfaction of human needs . . . ; changes in social relations especially with regard to governance . . . ; 
and an increase in the socio-political capability and access to resources”); see generally Pol & Ville, 
supra note 14, at 878–80 (describing various conceptions of social innovation related to institutional 
change, serving social purposes, serving the public good, and addressing market gaps). 
 15. Mulgan et al., supra note 2, at 4 & 50 n.A; Michael D. Mumford & Peter Moertl, Cases of 
Social Innovation: Lessons from Two Innovations in the 20th Century, 15 CREATIVITY RES. J. 261, 
261 (2003); H. Peyton Young, The Dynamics of Social Innovation, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 
AM. 21285, 21285 (2011); see Peter F. Drucker, Social Innovation—Management’s New Dimension, 
20 LONG RANGE PLAN. 29, 31–32 (1987). 
 16. Cf. Social Innovation, CENTRE FOR SOCIAL INNOVATION, http://social innovation.ca/about/ 
social-innovation, archived at http://perma.cc/SE4D-59QY (“Definitions of social innovation abound 
and a casual observer can quickly become entangled in a debate over meaning and nuance. We’re not 
too hung up about it so we’ve adopted a simple working definition: Social innovation refers to the 
creation, development, adoption, and integration of new concepts and practices that put the planet first. 
Social innovations resolve existing social, cultural, economic and environmental challenges.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss1/5
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substantively serve the public interest, are widely accessible within a 
target community, and produce changes in individual or institutional 
behavior. 
First, innovations can be “social” in the sense that they aim to enhance 
social welfare. This is a complex inquiry, for just about every 
innovation—such as a streamlined method of texting—enhances social 
welfare. Social innovations, however, address more substantive human 
needs than ordinary consumer preferences.
17
 Classic subjects of social 
innovation include health, safety, education, homelessness, crime 
prevention, environmental protection, racial and gender discrimination, 
and inequality in economic opportunity.
18
 Both impact and motivation are 
important in characterizing an innovation as social. In general, the primary 
motivation of a social innovation is to enhance public welfare rather than 
to maximize financial returns, thus distinguishing these innovations from 
typical commercial ventures.
19
 This is a complicated inquiry, however, 
because even nonprofits are concerned with cost recovery, and many for-
profit entities generate social innovations that support their profit-making 
objectives.
20
 As a general matter, however, a social entrepreneur “[i]s 
encouraged to produce social impact with a selfless, entrepreneurial 
intelligence and innovative drive.”21 Social innovations aim to create 
social rather than market value.
22
  
 
 
 17. Cf. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 55–58 (Roger Crisp ed., 1998) (proposing a 
hierarchy of pleasures in contradistinction to hedonistic utilitarianism, which does not rank-order 
preferences). 
 18. See, e.g., Phills Jr. et al., supra note 3, at 38 (listing “justice, fairness, environmental 
preservation, improved health, arts and culture, and better education” as objects of social innovation); 
cf. Leadbeater, supra note 6, at 6 (“[Social enterprise deals with] social justice, inequality and 
inclusion; community integration; environment; trade justice and development.”). 
 19. Filipe Santos et al., The Life Cycle of Social Innovations, in SOC. INNOVATION, CSR, 
SUSTAINABILITY, ETHICS & GOVERNANCE, at 183, 185 (Thomas Osburg & René Schmidpeter eds., 
2013) (“Social entrepreneurs do not focus on value capture for themselves or their organization, but 
rather on improving the world and creating value in a particular domain of the society that they feel 
passionate about improving.”). But see Roger L. Martin & Sally Osberg, Social Entrepreneurship: The 
Case for Definition, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Spring 2007, at 29, 34 (arguing that commercial 
entrepreneurs, like social entrepreneurs, are motivated primarily by the psychic reward of exploiting a 
new opportunity rather than by profits).  
 20. See, e.g., Drucker, supra note 15, at 29–30 (describing General Electric’s pioneering model 
of team-oriented, multidisciplinary research, which both served profit motives as well as became a 
widely emulated social innovation); Rosabeth Moss Kanter, From Spare Change to Real Change: The 
Social Sector as Beta Site for Business Innovation, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1999, at 122, 124, 
126–27 (describing Bell Atlantic’s “beta testing” of a computer network in a New Jersey school 
system); Rajdeep Sengupta & Craig P. Aubuchon, The Microfinance Revolution: An Overview, 90 
FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 9, 15 (2008) (describing Banco Solidario, a for-profit microfinance 
entity). 
 21. OECD, FOSTERING INNOVATION, supra note 13, at 13. 
 22. Phills Jr. et al., supra note 3, at 39. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Second, innovations can be “social” in the sense that their outputs are 
widely available to the public at large or a target community. Such is the 
case with classic social innovations such as community policing
23
 or 
strategies to reduce homelessness,
24
 which aim for wide accessibility 
within a particular community. Some social innovations even attain the 
status of public goods,
25
 such as lending libraries, which Benjamin 
Franklin pioneered in the eighteenth century.
26
 More recently, some have 
characterized Wikipedia as a social innovation due in part to its broad 
accessibility.
27
 Wide access thus helps distinguish social innovations from 
other creations that may also enhance social welfare. For example, a 
cholesterol-reducing drug produced by a for-profit pharmaceutical 
company enhances public welfare, but if the company sells it at 
supracompetitive prices, it would be difficult to characterize it as a social 
innovation. By contrast, the affordable treatments produced by OneWorld 
Health, which uses underutilized intellectual property to develop 
treatments for diseases in low-income countries, are more characteristic of 
social innovations.
28
  
Along similar lines, although social innovations aim for wide 
availability, they are not necessarily incompatible with the exclusivity 
inherent in intellectual property. Indeed, some social innovations arise at 
the intersection of public interest objectives and exclusive rights. For 
example, the Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture 
(PIPRA) represents a “consortium of over forty universities and research 
institutions . . . [which] aggregates and licenses agriculture-related patents 
for exploitation in the developing world.”29 Furthermore, the Orphan Drug 
Act provides for exclusive rights to motivate parties to develop treatments 
 
 
 23. See George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1, 1982, at 29, 
29, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/. 
 24. See Community Voice Mail, SPRINGWIRE, http://www.cvm.org/our-work/community-voice-
mail/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2014) (describing an innovative program to provide free voice mail to 
homeless individuals to help obtain jobs, housing, and social services). 
 25. In economic terms, a public good is nonrival (additional consumption of the resource does 
not diminish its availability for others) and nonexcludable (absent legal intervention, it is not easy to 
naturally exclude others from consuming the resource). Although all social innovations aim for wide 
accessibility within a target population, restrictions on the boundaries of that population may preclude 
a social innovation from achieving the status of a public good. For instance, a program to provide free 
voice mail accounts to homeless individuals would not constitute a public good, as it is restricted to 
individuals meeting the program criteria.  
 26. Mumford, supra note 2, at 257–58. 
 27. Leadbeater, supra note 6, at 9. 
 28. Id. at 10. 
 29. Richard C. Atkinson et al., Intellectual Property Rights: Public Sector Collaboration for 
Agricultural IP Management, 301 SCIENCE 174, 175 (2003); Lee, Distributive Commons, supra note 
9, at 984. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss1/5
  
 
 
 
 
2014] SOCIAL INNOVATION 11 
 
 
 
 
for rare diseases.
30
 On a somewhat related note, the United States Patent & 
Trademark Office (USPTO) has created the Patents for Humanity 
program, which utilizes various rewards to “incentivize the distribution of 
patented technologies to address humanitarian needs.”31  
Third, innovations can be “social” in the sense that they change 
interpersonal interactions and social relations. One commentator has 
defined social innovation as “the generation and implementation of new 
ideas about how people should organize interpersonal activities, or social 
interactions, to meet one or more common goals.”32 The classic social 
innovation is usually not a discrete device, such as a toothbrush, even 
though it may significantly enhance social welfare. Rather, a novel 
program for demonstrating proper brushing techniques and dental health 
care in at-risk communities would satisfy this aspect of shaping social 
relations. Accordingly, social innovations tend to be processes, services, 
and programs rather than physical products.
33
 For example, San 
Francisco’s First Offenders of Prostitution Program (FOPP) provides 
education and counseling to first-time solicitors of prostitution, thus 
diverting them from the court system. FOPP explicitly seeks behavioral 
change on the part of its participants, who exhibit a very low recidivism 
rate.
34
 Another example of a social innovation that changes interpersonal 
interactions is the “Living Room Restaurant” program in the Netherlands, 
which encourages elderly people to host strangers for communal dinners 
in their homes.
35
 This innovation helps combat social isolation and 
facilitates intergenerational interaction. Extrapolating beyond local 
programs, some social innovations transform behavioral patterns on a 
 
 
 30. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983); Verification of Orphan Drug 
Status, 21 C.F.R. § 316.2 (2004) (offering exclusive rights on treatments for diseases that affect less 
than 200,000 U.S. citizens). 
 31. Humanitarian Awards Pilot Program, 77 Fed. Reg. 6544, 6544 (Feb. 8, 2012) (describing the 
initiative that was later renamed the Patents for Humanity program).  
 32. Mumford, supra note 2, at 253. 
 33. There are, of course, exceptions, particularly where a certain product deeply impacts social 
relations and economic prospects. For example, KickStart is an African venture that manufactures the 
MoneyMaker foot-operated irrigation pump, which is a low-cost solution that has helped generate 
41,000 profitable new businesses since 1993. Clayton M. Christensen et al., Disruptive Innovation for 
Social Change, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2006, at 94, 100. 
 34. See Ellyn Bell & Mollie King, The First Offender Prostitution Program 4 (The SAGE 
Project, White Paper, 2013), available at http://sagesf.org/sites/default/files/FOPP_White_Paper_ 
revised.pdf. 
 35. See Living Room Restaurant, EMUDE CREATIVE COMMUNITIES (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www. 
sustainable-everyday-project.net/emude/2013/04/03/living-room-restaurant/, archived at http://perma. 
cc/BR24-V5GZ. 
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massive scale, as seen in the introduction of charter schools,
36
 fair trade,
37
 
and local police and fire services.
38
  
Related to their “social” nature, many social innovations have an 
explicitly distributive character. As a preliminary matter, social 
innovations can also promote efficiency by mitigating classic market 
failure.
39
 The inability of parties to adequately internalize positive 
externalities can depress incentives to invent, thus creating market failure 
in the production of anything from semiconductors to strategies to reduce 
MRSA infections.
40
 While intellectual property rights are one mechanism 
to address such market failure, the altruistic motivations and public 
funding that drive social innovations are another. Beyond efficiency 
considerations, however, social innovations often play a distributive role 
in shifting resources to underserved communities. Social innovations 
address underserved markets, such as when microfinance entities provide 
loans to populations who do not qualify for traditional financing. Going 
further, social innovations sometimes provide essential goods and services 
to entirely neglected populations on a charitable basis.
41
 For example, 
Springwire is a Seattle-based nonprofit that offers Community Voice Mail, 
which provides homeless individuals with private, local phone numbers 
and associated voice mail accounts that they can check anytime for free.
42
 
The ability to distribute contact information and receive voice mail is 
instrumental in helping participants find jobs, housing, and social services. 
Springwire’s work thus reflects the distributive nature of social 
innovations that shift resources to an underserved community. 
In addition to addressing deficiencies in the market, social innovations 
also help address deficiencies in political decision making.
43
 It is almost 
 
 
 36. Phills Jr. et al., supra note 3, at 40. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Mumford, supra note 2, at 257–58. 
 39. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., SMES, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INNOVATION 214 
(2010), http://www.oecd.org/menu/investment/44936057.pdf [hereinafter OECD, ENTREPRENEURSHIP].  
 40. See Phills Jr. et al., supra note 3, at 39 (“It is only when markets fail—in the case of public 
goods—that social innovation becomes important as a way to meet needs that would not otherwise be 
met and to create value that would not otherwise be created.”). 
 41. See, e.g., Gerometta et al., supra note 14, at 2012 (“Social innovation is key to countering 
trends of social exclusion and to fostering social inclusion processes.”). 
 42. Community Voice Mail, supra note 24 
 43. See Leadbeater, supra note 6, at 3 (“The way social enterprises operate is often, at least 
implicitly, a critique of the limitations of public service provision.”); Guillermo Casasnovas & Albert 
V. Bruno, Scaling Social Ventures: An Exploratory Study of Social Incubators and Accelerators, 2 J. 
MGMT. GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY 173, 174 (2013). 
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tautological that the preferences of poor people are underrepresented in the 
market. Though not as intuitive, the same is also true for the political 
process. A rich literature has demonstrated that legislatures tend to 
respond to well-organized, well-funded political interests,
44
 which do not 
commonly represent the concerns of poor people. After all, well-heeled 
lobbies do not typically champion strategies to combat homelessness. 
Social innovations thus address political failure, when governments ignore 
social problems due to the marginal political status of underprivileged 
communities.
45
 
Of course, to say that social innovations address deficiencies in market 
and governmental allocation is not to say that they proceed outside of the 
market or government. The market is a robust source of social 
innovation.
46
 “Social enterprises” meld business operations and strategies 
with public ends,
47
 and socially responsible business has been a fount of 
innovation.
48
 Furthermore, certain businesses that provide lower cost 
services to underserved market segments bear some of the characteristics 
of social innovations.
49
 For example, Freelancers Union is aggregating 
contractors, consultants, part-time workers, temps, and others in the New 
York area to provide low-cost health insurance.
50
 Similarly, the 
HealthStore Foundation in Kenya trains residents in rural areas to provide 
basic health care services.
51
 Such social innovations “are in the market and 
yet against it at the same time.”52 Additionally, government is also a 
source of social innovation.
53
 For example, In Control is a joint venture 
between the UK Department of Health and Mencap that allocates 
 
 
 44. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 141–48 (1965) (describing the influence of business lobbies in government).  
 45. See Santos et al., supra note 19, at 186 (“In this case, markets tend to fail due to the 
externalities while governments tend to ignore these needs due to the little voice that disadvantaged 
populations have.”). 
 46. Pol & Ville, supra note 14, at 880 (disputing any bright line distinguishing social from 
business innovations). 
 47. Sarah H. Alvord et al., Social Entrepreneurship and Societal Transformation, 40 J. APPLIED 
BEHAV. SCI. 260, 262 (2004). 
 48. See Leadbeater, supra note 6, at 12 (listing examples of socially responsible businesses). 
 49. See generally Christensen et al., supra note 33, at 96. 
 50. Id. at 97–98. 
 51. Id. at 99–100. 
 52. Leadbeater, supra note 6, at 2. 
 53. See generally Zachary Tumin & Archon Fung, From Government 2.0 to Society 2.0: 
Pathways to Engagement, Collaboration and Transformation, BELFER CENTER (2011), http://www. 
innovations.harvard.edu/cache/documents/19773/1977353.pdf (describing numerous innovations in 
government); see INNOVATESF (2013), http://innovatesf.com/ (describing innovation initiatives within 
San Francisco government). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
14 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:1 
 
 
 
 
individual health budgets and intensive support to patients.
54
 This 
represents an innovative twist on the provision of public services by 
empowering patients to decide how to spend their money.
55
 More 
generally, outside parties routinely recognize government innovation with 
high-profile awards.
56
 
Although there are many axes upon which to order social innovations, 
two are particularly useful for the current analysis. The first is the degree 
of abstraction at which the social innovation is described. Social 
innovations run the gamut from large, abstract “movements,” such as the 
environmental movement, to concrete programs that affect a local 
community, such as Jamie Oliver’s UK program for training 
underprivileged youths in catering.
57
 The second is the degree to which a 
social innovation is oriented toward market activities.
58
 As mentioned, 
many social innovations take place within the market and explicitly fill 
gaps in the economy. For example, Project Impact, a social enterprise in 
San Francisco, distributes digital hearing aids at significantly lower costs 
in the developing world.
59
 At the other end of the spectrum are social 
innovations that do not directly address commercial interests (although 
they may have long-term economic effects), such as CBT or techniques to 
reduce hospital-based infections.  
 
 
 54. Leadbeater, supra note 6, at 11. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Innovations in American Government Awards, ASH CTR. FOR DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE AND INNOVATION (2014), http://www.ash.harvard.edu/Home/Programs/Innovations-in-
Government/Awards. 
 57. Leadbeater, supra note 6, at 2. 
 58.  See infra Figure 1. 
 59. Leadbeater, supra note 6, at 12. 
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FIGURE 1: EXAMPLE OF MAPPING SOCIAL INNOVATIONS 
 
In exploring social innovation, it is useful to compare it to other forms 
of creativity that proceed on the margins of formal intellectual property 
law.
60
 For instance, patent scholars have examined academic sharing 
norms that facilitate wide access to research findings, thus promoting 
scientific productivity.
61
 In the copyright realm, Christopher Sprigman and 
his colleagues have examined highly creative processes in the fashion and 
stand-up comedy industries that unfold largely outside of formal exclusive 
rights.
62
 Similar studies of cuisine,
63
 magic,
64
 roller derby,
65
 tattoos,
66
 and 
 
 
 60. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual Production 
Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1437, 1437–38 (2010) [hereinafter 
Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP?]. 
 61. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1017–18; Robert Merges, Property Rights Theory and 
the Commons: The Case of Scientific Research, 13 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 145, 164–65 (1996); Arti Kaur 
Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. 
L. REV. 77, 79–80 (1999).  
 62. See Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The 
Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-up Comedy, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 1787, 1789–91 (2008); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation 
and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1689–92 (2006).  
 63. Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should Thomas Keller’s 
Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121, 1122–24 (2007). 
 64. Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed: Protecting Magicians’ Intellectual Property Without Law, in 
LAW AND MAGIC: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 123 (Christine A. Corcos ed., 2010).  
 65. David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me: Intellectual Property Norms Governing Roller Derby 
Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093, 1097–99 (2012). 
 66. Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 511, 512–14 (2013). 
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the adult entertainment industry
67
 demonstrate that even in the absence of 
formal or effective intellectual property rights, creators still engage in a 
significant degree of innovation.  
Social innovation is both similar to and different from these other 
forms of “innovation without IP.” In many of these domains, creators seek 
informal proprietary claims even in the absence of formal exclusive rights. 
For example, in the stand-up comedy and roller derby realms, reputational 
costs provide powerful incentives against misappropriating other people’s 
jokes and trade names.
68
 Social innovations are different in that many 
(though perhaps not all) social entrepreneurs welcome wide adoption of 
their innovations.
69
 In this sense, the motivations of social entrepreneurs 
are more akin to scientists who freely publish their findings in order to 
promote communal progress.
70
 Here again, however, there are differences. 
The scientific commons achieves its objectives by providing a repository 
of knowledge from which all can draw. As we will see, however, parties 
can seldom transfer social innovations merely by passively making 
information public.
71
 The highly relational and contextual nature of social 
innovations demands a significant degree of “personal touch” to spread 
such innovations.  
Perhaps the best way to elucidate social innovations is by discussing 
specific examples.
72
 Case studies of CBT, microfinance, and strategies to 
reduce MRSA infections illustrate the “social” nature of such innovations 
in terms of objectives, outputs, and modifying human behavior. 
Furthermore, they also provide an empirical basis for comparing social 
innovation with patent law’s conception of protectable innovation, which 
this Article will explore in the following Part. 
 
 
 67. Kate Darling, What Drives IP Without IP? A Study of the Online Adult Entertainment 
Industry, STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 4–6) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2198934). 
 68. See, e.g., Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 62, at 1790 (“[I]n stand-up comedy, social norms 
substitute for intellectual property law.”); id. at 1791 (discussing reputation costs in stand-up comedy); 
Fagundes, supra note 65, at 1123 n.155. 
 69. This phenomenon may be understood as a different kind of “piracy paradox” than the one 
that Raustiala and Sprigman describe in the fashion industry. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 
62, at 1691–92. Traditionally, designers in the fashion industry have begrudgingly tolerated piracy. In 
the social innovation context, however, “piracy” in the sense of copying is often welcomed. 
 70. See Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory, 1 
MINERVA 54, 54 (1962) (describing an autonomous scientific community with a high degree of 
internal communication). 
 71. See infra notes 213–26 and accompanying text. 
 72. Cf. Mumford & Moertl, supra note 15, at 261 (stating that a historic case study approach is 
“particularly well suited to studying complex, multifaceted phenomena such as social innovation”). 
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B. Case Studies 
1. Cognitive Behavioral Therapy 
Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) encompasses a set of 
psychological techniques for modifying cognition, mood, and behavior.
73
 
As with many social innovations, the history of CBT reveals a long 
process of evolution and many formative influences. CBT has roots in 
behaviorism, a psychological movement prominent in the early twentieth 
century that focused on observable behaviors of people and animals. Early 
behaviorism focused on theories of learning,
74
 and behavioral therapy, 
which encompasses strategies to “unlearn” fears through behavior 
modification, represents one of CBT’s key intellectual foundations.75 CBT 
arose from the merger of the behaviorist tradition with the “cognitive 
revolution”76 of the mid-twentieth century, which placed greater emphasis 
on the interior thoughts of patients rather than observable behavior.
77
 
Aaron Beck and Albert Ellis are widely credited with proposing CBT in 
the 1960s.
78
 Researchers tested CBT throughout the 1970s and 
subsequently disseminated it through policy and professional networks.
79
  
CBT reflects many of the characteristics of social innovations. First, it 
addresses the substantive human need for mental health and well-being. 
CBT has proven to be a highly effective treatment for unipolar depression, 
 
 
 73. See Douglas S. Mennen et al., United We Stand: Emphasizing Commonalities Across 
Cognitive-Behavioral Therapies, 44 BEHAV. THERAPY 234, 234 (2013) (“[CBTs] constitute a family 
of clinical interventions designed to produce behavior change.”). 
 74. David M. Clark, Developing New Treatments: On the Interplay Between Theories, 
Experimental Science and Clinical Innovation, 42 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 1089, 1090 (2004). 
 75. See Stanley Rachman, The Evolution of Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, in SCIENCE AND 
PRACTICE OF COGNITIVE BEHAVIOUR THERAPY 3, 6–7 (David M. Clark & Christopher G. Fairburn 
eds., 1997) (describing behaviorism in the United States and United Kingdom). 
 76. Mennin et al., supra note 73, at 234–35. 
 77. See Aaron T. Beck, Cognitive Therapy: Nature and Relation to Behavior Therapy, 1 BEHAV. 
THERAPY 184, 184–86 (1970) (discussing the commonalities of behavior and cognitive therapy and 
distinguishing them from psychoanalysis); Aaron T. Beck, Cognitive Therapy: Past, Present, and 
Future, 61 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 194, 197 (1993) (discussing similarities between 
behavior therapy and cognitive therapy). Accounts differ somewhat on the chronology of the merging 
of behaviorism and cognitive therapy. See, e.g., Rachman, supra note 75, at 3–4. In significant part, 
CBT also reflected a rejection of the “unfalsifiable” tenets of psychoanalysis and a desire to develop 
an empirically and scientifically rigorous approach to treating mental illness. See id. at 10–11. 
 78. See Clark, supra note 74, at 1092 (pointing to Beck’s “key intellectual move” of proposing 
that negative thoughts were not simply a symptom of depression, but a key factor in sustaining the 
disease); see also Rachman, supra note 75, at 13 (detailing the importance of Beck and Ellis in 
propagating CBT). 
 79. Mulgan, supra note 2, at 146.  
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anxiety disorders, and eating disorders, among other conditions.
80
 
Furthermore, the cognitive and affective neuroscience literature has helped 
validate CBT’s underlying theory, demonstrating that therapy is associated 
with changes in physiological activity in the brain.
81
 In terms of 
motivations, there is no indication that the prospect of financial return 
played a significant role in the development of CBT. The framers of CBT 
genuinely sought a more effective way to ameliorate mental illness.
82
 
Second, although CBT involves the costly expertise of a therapist, it is 
widely available in the sense that it is not subject to exclusive rights. 
Indeed, a cottage industry of books has attempted to disseminate CBT 
broadly throughout the general public.
83
 Third, CBT is social both because 
it seeks to instill behavioral change and because it unfolds in the context of 
an extended interaction between therapist and patient.
84
 
Like many social innovations, it can be difficult to clearly demarcate 
the boundaries of CBT. It does not represent a single treatment protocol 
but refers to a family of related techniques that share a similar cognitive 
model of intervention.
85
 Indeed, commentators distinguish between 
“traditional” CBTs and a host of “recent” CBTs, and new offshoots such 
as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) are stretching the 
boundaries of CBT.
86
 Furthermore, there is little standardization of care, as 
many therapists pick and choose from treatment protocols as they see fit 
and mix CBT with other interventions.
87
  
Also typical of social innovations, CBT has faced significant 
challenges of dissemination. Although CBT is more cost-effective than 
other treatments for mental illness,
88
 the large advertising budgets that help 
 
 
 80. R. Shafran et al., Mind the Gap: Improving the Dissemination of CBT, 47 BEHAV. RES. & 
THERAPY 902, 902 (2009).  
 81. Stefan G. Hofmann et al., The Science of Cognitive Therapy, 44 BEHAV. THERAPY 199, 203 
(2013). While Hofmann et al. use the term “cognitive therapy,” that term can be understood as 
interchangeable with CBT. See, e.g., History of Cognitive Therapy, BECK INST. FOR COGNITIVE 
BEHAV. THERAPY, http://www.beckinstitute.org/history-of-cbt/, archived at http://perma.cc/5GLW-
7YDX (last visited Oct. 10, 2014). 
 82. Cf. Stephen G. Weinrach, Cognitive Therapist: A Dialogue with Aaron Beck, 67 J. 
COUNSELING & DEV. 159, 159 (1988) (interviewing one of the founders of CBT, Aaron Beck). 
 83. See, e.g., DAVID D. BURNS, THE FEELING GOOD HANDBOOK (1999). 
 84. Weinrach, supra note 82, at 160 (interviewing Aaron Beck, who describes a typical twelve to 
sixteen week regimen of psychotherapy). 
 85. Hofmann et al., supra note 81, at 206; Mennin et al., supra note 73, at 236. 
 86. Compare Hofmann et al., supra note 81, at 201 (describing theoretical differences between 
ACT and CBT but noting the two approaches are not necessarily inconsistent), with Mennin et al., 
supra note 73, at 235 (characterizing ACT as part of the current expansion of CBTs). 
 87. Shafran et al., supra note 80, at 905.  
 88. Id. at 903; cf. Hofmann et al., supra note 81, at 199 (“[P]rovision of CT for common mental 
disorders is more cost-efficient than pharmacotherapy or other interventions.”). 
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drug companies market pharmacotherapies are absent for CBT.
89
 
Furthermore, notwithstanding empirical evidence, some mental health 
professionals are skeptical of the applicability of CBT to clinical 
practice.
90
 Beyond CBT, new psychological techniques generally face 
difficulties of dissemination, particularly across professional and cultural 
lines. For instance, one study characterized health services as “tribal,” 
noting the resistance of speech pathologists to adopt treatments developed 
by psychiatrists and psychologists.
91
 Oftentimes, successful dissemination 
requires “personal contact between the innovators and adopters if change 
is to happen.”92 This need for interpersonal interaction to spread a new 
practice is a consistent theme applying to many social innovations. 
2. Microfinance 
Microfinance also reflects many of the characteristics of social 
innovations. Microfinance refers to a variety of financial services offered 
to low-income individuals, often with the explicit aim of alleviating 
poverty by allowing borrowers to invest in revenue-generating activities.
93
 
Microfinance includes microcredit, which refers to originating and 
servicing loans, but also encompasses a broader suite of financial services 
spanning savings accounts, insurance, mortgages, and retirement plans.
94
 
Microfinance gained widespread prominence due to the work of 
Muhammad Yunus, who in 1976 lent $27 to forty-two women who made 
bamboo stools in Bangladesh.
95
 Yunus founded Grameen Bank, which has 
gone on to disburse $9.1 billion in loans and expand to thirty-seven 
countries.
96
 The United Nations designated 2005 as the International Year 
of Microcredit,
97
 and Yunus and Grameen Bank jointly won the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 2006.
98
 As of 2008, 1,000 to 2,500 microfinance institutions 
 
 
 89. Clark, supra note 74, at 1100.  
 90. Shafran et al., supra note 80, at 903. 
 91. Gavin Andrews & Nickolai Titov, Hit and Miss: Innovation and the Dissemination of 
Evidence Based Psychological Treatments, 47 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 974, 974 (2009). 
 92. Id. at 975. 
 93. See Anne Perkins, A Short History of Microfinance, GUARDIAN, June 3, 2008, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/katine/2008/jun/03/livelihoods.projectgoals1; see generally Jonathan 
Morduch, The Microfinance Promise, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1569 (1999). 
 94. Susanna Khavul, Microfinance: Creating Opportunities for the Poor?, ACAD. MGMT. 
PERSP., Aug. 2010, at 58. 
 95. Sengupta & Aubuchon, supra note 20, at 9. 
 96. Khavul, supra note 94, at 58. 
 97. J. Jordan Pollinger et al., The Question of Sustainability for Microfinance Institutions, 45 J. 
SMALL BUS. MGMT. 23, 24 (2007). 
 98. Sengupta & Aubuchon, supra note 20, at 9. 
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(MFIs) served approximately 67.6 million individuals in over 100 
countries.
99
 
Microfinance is a social innovation in multiple senses of the term. 
First, MFIs address the serious social problem of persistent poverty; many 
microfinance initiatives are aimed at the estimated 2.8 billion people who 
live on less than $2 a day.
100
 The efforts of MFIs are explicitly 
distributive; Grameen Bank targets the poor and overwhelmingly lends to 
women, who comprise ninety-seven percent of borrowers.
101
 Second, 
while some MFIs, such as Banco Solidario in Bolivia, aim to earn a 
profit,
102
 others, like Grameen Bank, charge below-market rates to 
promote wide access to credit.
103
 MFIs like Grameen Bank thus fill gaps in 
the market by serving communities that traditional banks have ignored.
104
 
Third, microfinance explicitly aims to alter social relations and human 
behavior. Most MFIs seek to fund wealth-generating activities, such as 
farming or entrepreneurship, rather than personal consumption. 
Furthermore, Grameen Bank has pioneered a form of “group lending,” 
described further below, in which borrowers influence each other in 
making repayments.
105
 Finally, many MFIs are expanding beyond 
financial services to provide a broader range of social services to low-
income borrowers, such as healthcare and educational services.
106
 
A notable aspect of microfinance, in some ways the quintessential 
social innovation, is that it is not really new. Traditional village savings 
and loan associations have operated in a similar fashion for decades.
107
 
Indonesia, for instance, “has a long history of commercial microfinance” 
since the emergence of village credit boards in the late nineteenth 
century.
108
 And microfinance itself has evolved through several phases. 
 
 
 99. Id. at 10. 
 100. Khavul, supra note 94, at 59. 
 101. Sengupta & Aubuchon, supra note 20, at 11. The effectiveness of microfinance in alleviating 
poverty is subject to some debate. While Yunus claims that 5% of Grameen Bank’s borrowers leave 
poverty every year, empirical studies have questioned the degree to which microfinance contributes to 
such outcomes relative to other factors. Anis Chowdhury, Microfinance as a Poverty Reduction Tool—
A Critical Assessment 1 (DESA Working Paper No. 89, Dec. 2009); see Chowdhury, supra at 5 (“In 
sum, microfinance is not a panacea for poverty reduction, which needs both complementary supply-
side and demand-side factors.”). 
 102. Sengupta & Aubuchon, supra note 20, at 15.  
 103. Id. at 10. 
 104. Id. at 9; Khavul, supra note 94, at 59, 61; Pollinger et al., supra note 97, at 24. 
 105. See infra notes 111–14 and accompanying text. 
 106. Sengupta & Aubuchon, supra note 20, at 10, 14. 
 107. Perkins, supra note 93.  
 108. Miki Hamada, Financial Services to the Poor: An Introduction to the Special Issue on 
Microfinance, 48 DEVELOPING ECONS. 1, 10 (2010). 
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From the 1960s to the 1980s, microfinance focused on providing credit for 
small farmers subsidized by government and donors. After the 1980s, the 
emphasis of microcredit shifted to the poor.
109
 In the 2000s, another shift 
took place toward “inclusive finance,” which extends beyond 
microfinance to create a more comprehensive financial system to address 
the needs of low-income populations.
110
  
Though based on longstanding traditions, the most recent incarnation 
of microfinance has introduced some new innovations. One development, 
referred to as “Grameencredit” or more generally as “group lending,”111 is 
a system of lending based on social regulation rather than collateral and 
enforceable contracts.
112
 Within Grameencredit, Grameen Bank lends to 
borrowers self-organized into groups rather than to individuals. Whether 
or not some group members receive loans depends on the repayment of 
other members.
113
 Through such “associative matching,” MFIs can 
leverage local information about trustworthiness as well as group pressure 
to filter out potential credit risks and ensure high repayment rates.
114
 Such 
group lending further reflects the “social” nature of microfinance.  
3. Combating MRSA 
Strategies to combat bacterial infections in hospitals also exhibit many 
of the characteristics of social innovations. According to the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, “about 1.7 million people acquire an 
infection while in a U.S. hospital every year, and nearly 100,000 die as a 
result of their infections.”115 A significant cause of these nosocomial (i.e., 
hospital-based) infections is methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
(MRSA), a particularly virulent bacterium.
116
 MRSA infections account 
 
 
 109. Id. at 5. 
 110. Id. at 6. 
 111. See id. at 3; Khavul, supra note 94, at 61. 
 112. Sengupta & Aubuchon, supra note 20, at 9. 
 113. Id. at 11–12. 
 114. Id. at 12; Khavul, supra note 94, at 61; Hamada, supra note 108, at 1; Ana Marr, 
Effectiveness of Rural Microfinance: What We Know and What We Need to Know, 12 J. AGRARIAN 
CHANGE 555, 555–56 (2012). 
 115. Gina Shaw, Mastering MRSA: Pilot Project Lowers Rates 73 Percent, ROBERT WOOD 
JOHNSON FOUNDATION (Nov. 10, 2009), www.rwjf.org/reports/grr/055726.html; see also Marc J. 
Struelens & Dominique L. Monnet, Prevention of Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
Infection: Is Europe Winning the Fight?, 31 INFECTION CONTROL & HOSP. EPIDEMIOLOGY, 542, 542 
(2010) (describing strategies to combat MRSA infections in European hospitals).  
 116. Shaw, supra note 115, at 2; R. Monina Klevens et al., Invasive Methicillin-Resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus Infections in the United States, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1763, 1763 (2007); M. 
Patricia Jevons, “Celbenin”-Resistant Staphylococci, BRIT. MED. J., Jan. 14, 1961, at 124–25.  
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for nearly seventy-five percent of intensive care unit (ICU) S. aureus 
infections and sixty percent of non-ICU S. aureus infections.
117
 Although 
MRSA infections are a serious and challenging problem, stakeholders 
have developed some highly effective, low-tech, and low-cost innovations 
to address them. For example, healthcare institutions have promoted 
changes to health worker attire, conscientious “degowning” techniques, 
and strict hand-washing protocols to reduce MRSA infections.
118
  
Techniques for reducing MRSA infections reflect many of the qualities 
of social innovations. First, they address a pressing health need. In 2005, 
approximately 94,360 people developed MRSA infections related to their 
hospital care, leading to 18,650 deaths.
119
 Second, such efforts are 
intended for broad replication. Indeed, government entities have taken the 
lead in widely promoting such strategies, which are typically low cost and 
not subject to exclusive rights.
120
 For example, the UK Department of 
Health recognizes that it is a “good practice” for healthcare workers to 
“[w]ear short-sleeved shirts/blouses and avoid wearing white coats” to 
reduce bacterial transmissions.
121
 Furthermore, it discourages wearing 
rings, wrist jewelry, wristwatches, and neckties because of the potential 
for spreading microorganisms.
122
 Finally, such efforts to reduce hospital-
based infections involve changing human and institutional behavior. As 
discussed further below, many of these innovations are not technologically 
advanced or expensive, but they do require altering individual and 
communal practices.
123
  
 
 
 117. Julia Moody et al., Infection Prevention Practices in Adult Intensive Care Units in a Large 
Community Hospital System After Implementing Strategies to Reduce Health Care-Associated 
Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus Infections, 41 AM. J. INFECTION CONTROL 126, 126 
(2013). 
 118. See infra notes 124–28 and accompanying text. See also Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, 
The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1902 (2013) 
(describing how a simple checklist covering well-known hygienic practices has been effective in 
reducing infections from central-line catheters). 
 119. Klevens, supra note 116, at 1769.  
 120. See, e.g., J.E. Coia et al., Guidelines for the Control and Prevention of Meticillin-Resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in Healthcare Facilities, 63S J. HOSP. INFECTION S1 (2006). 
 121. Graham Jacob, Uniforms and Workwear: An Evidence Base for Developing Local Policy, 
DEP’T OF HEALTH 7 (2007), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www. 
dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/documents/digitalasset/dh_078435.pdf; see Amy 
M. Treakle, Bacterial Contamination of Health Care Workers’ White Coats, 37 AM. J. INFECTION 
CONTROL 101, 101 (2009) (describing the UK Department of Health recommendations); id. at 103 
(describing study results that health care workers’ white coats are frequently contaminated with S. 
aureus, many of which are methicillin resistant). 
 122. Jacob, supra note 121, at 9–10. 
 123. In this fashion, underinvestment in strategies to prevent MRSA infections may reflect 
distortions in private investment toward highly excludable interventions (such as patented 
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Notably, several strategies to combat MRSA infections are quite simple 
and inexpensive. Evidence suggests that clothing is a vector for 
transmitting MRSA
124
 and that simple interventions like changing 
healthcare worker attire and eliminating neckties may reduce infections.
125
 
Other low-tech approaches involve changing degowning techniques and 
washing one’s hands. For example, Jasper Palmer, a patient transport 
worker at Albert Einstein Medical Center, developed a method of 
removing one’s gown, rolling it into a baseball-sized sphere, and then 
pulling one’s glove over it to minimize spreading bacteria.126 In one study 
at a 350-bed, tertiary hospital, introducing antimicrobial hand hygiene gel 
to the ICU as well as a hospital-wide MRSA surveillance program reduced 
the rate of MRSA infections.
127
 The Institute of Healthcare Improvement 
recommends improved hand hygiene among several strategies to reduce 
MRSA and other nosocomial infections.
128
  
As with many social innovations, much of the challenge of combatting 
MRSA infections inheres not in developing some advanced technology but 
in translating knowledge “into social and behavioral change.”129 
Combining a variety of low-tech strategies along with community buy-in, 
four of six healthcare centers in a pilot project saw a seventy-three percent 
reduction in MRSA infection rates.
130
 Engaging front-line staff was 
particularly important to the success of these innovations.
131
 In one set of 
pilot studies, small group conversations with front-line staff, dubbed 
“Discovery and Action Dialogue,” were critical to internalizing best 
practices throughout hospitals.
132
 At the Pittsburgh Regional Healthcare 
Initiative, a “positive deviance”133 approach to instilling cultural change in 
 
 
pharmaceuticals) and away from highly nonexcludable ones (such as behavioral changes). See 
Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 118, at 1937.  
 124. Jacob, supra note 121, at 6. 
 125. Shaw, supra note 115, at 4; see also Steve Nurkin, Doctor’s Neckties: A Reservoir for 
Bacteria?, 104TH GENERAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR MICROBIOLOGY (May 23–27, 
2004); K.C. Koh et al., High Prevalence of Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) on 
Doctors’ Neckties, 64 MED. J. MALAY. 233, 233 (2009).  
 126. Shaw, supra note 115, at 4. 
 127. H. Humphreys, Can We Do Better in Controlling and Preventing Methicillin-Resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU)?, 17 EUR. J. CLINICAL 
MICROBIOLOGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES 409, 411 (2008). 
 128. F.M. Byrne & M.H. Wilcox, MRSA Prevention Strategies and Current Guidelines, 42 
INJURY S3, S4 (2011).  
 129. Shaw, supra note 115, at 2. 
 130. Id. at 4; Curt Lindberg et al., Letting Go, Gaining Control: Positive Deviance and MRSA 
Prevention, 2 CLINICAL LEADER 60, 62 (2009). 
 131. Shaw, supra note 115, at 6. 
 132. Lindberg et al., supra note 130, at 63. 
 133. See infra notes 191–201 and accompanying text. 
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front-line staff led to a fifty percent decrease in the infection rate.
134
 The 
Department of Veterans Affairs adopted this approach in almost all of its 
hospitals, and from October 2007 to June 2010, MRSA infections in ICUs 
at 153 hospitals dropped by forty-five percent.
135
 Community buy-in was 
critical for effectively spreading this social innovation. 
These case studies of CBT, microfinance, and strategies to combat 
MRSA infections reflect many of the characteristics of social innovations. 
They all address substantive social challenges, ranging from mental illness 
to persistent poverty to hospital-based infections. And while it is difficult 
to look inside the minds of those who developed these innovations, it is 
fair to say they were largely motivated by a desire to enhance social 
welfare rather than maximize profits. Furthermore, these innovations are 
all intended for wide dissemination. Although labor and resource costs 
(such as for therapists applying CBT) naturally constrain the availability 
of these innovations, none of them is subject to formal exclusive rights. 
Furthermore, these innovations are “social” in that they seek to change 
human behavior and social relations. This is a vibrant, incredibly valuable 
arena of innovation, and yet it largely proceeds outside of the patent 
system. Indeed, the empirical reality of social innovation helps illustrate 
the narrow and highly particularized conception of innovation embedded 
in patent law, a phenomenon which the next Part explores. 
II. INNOVATION WITHIN AND BEYOND THE PATENT PARADIGM 
This Part draws on the previous discussion to compare and contrast 
social innovation with patent law’s conception of legally protectable 
innovation. The objective of this Part is not to lay a foundation for 
extending patent protection to social innovations.
136
 Nor does it argue for a 
sharp distinction between social and technological innovation, which are 
overlapping domains.
137
 Rather, it aims to bring into sharper relief the 
highly particularized conception of innovation that patent law reifies and 
 
 
 134. Tina Rosenberg, When Deviants Do Good, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2013). 
 135. Id. Because this was not a randomized control trial, it is unclear how much of the 
improvement is attributable to positive deviance strategies. 
 136. Indeed, this Article will argue against extending exclusive rights to social innovations. See 
infra Part III.A. 
 137. See JONATHAN WALTERS, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, UNDERSTANDING INNOVATION: 
WHAT INSPIRES IT? WHAT MAKES IT SUCCESSFUL? 21–22 (2000); Mulgan et al., supra note 2, at 12 
(“[M]ost of what we now count as progress has come about through the mutual reinforcement of 
social, economic, technological, and political innovations.”); see, e.g., Tools for Better Living, 
FORTUNE, Dec. 11, 2006 (describing seven technologically driven innovations aimed at enhancing 
social welfare). 
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protects. In many ways, patent law’s conception of innovation deviates 
sharply from the manner in which social innovations arise. Ironically, the 
communal, organic nature of social innovation also applies to much 
“classic” technological innovation that qualifies for patent protection. This 
Article thus argues that patent law’s unique policy mechanism of 
assigning individual rights to inventions leads to a distorted conception of 
the innovative processes it seeks to promote. 
A. Knowledge Assets and Public Goods  
Before considering differences, it is instructive to explore 
commonalities between social innovations and patent law’s conception of 
protectable innovation. To start, social innovations, like patentable 
technologies, largely qualify as public goods.
138
 Economists have long 
observed that technical information, such as the design of a new Blu-ray 
player, is a public good, which is both nonrival
139
 (i.e., multiple parties can 
use it without diminishing its availability) and nonexcludable (i.e., absent 
legal intervention, it is difficult if not impossible to exclude others from 
appropriating it).
140
 Economic theory holds that a competitive market will 
produce a suboptimal level of new technology because the ease of 
appropriating such assets will lead to free riders, thus diminishing 
incentives to invent.
141
 Patents mitigate this market failure by granting 
exclusive rights, thus enhancing incentives to invent. 
In a formal sense, social innovations share these public good 
attributes.
142
 I will challenge this notion later, but for now it suffices to say 
that social innovations are essentially knowledge assets as well that are 
 
 
 138. In other work, I have criticized the characterization of technical information as a public good 
given the highly “tacit” nature of such information, which must be transferred through costly, labor-
intensive interpersonal interactions. See Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, 
Relationships, and Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503 
(2012) [hereinafter Lee, Tacit Dimension]. Such concerns arguably apply with greater force to social 
innovations. See infra notes 221–37 and accompanying text.  
 139. See THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON VOL. VI 180−81 (H.A. Washington ed., Taylor & 
Mary 1854) (describing ideas as “expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any 
point”). 
 140. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 614–16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research ed., 1962) (noting the difficulties of preventing outside parties from appropriating 
information); Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best 
Incentive System?, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY, VOLUME 2, at 51, 52 (Adam B. Jaffe 
et al. eds., 2002). 
 141. See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1024–25.  
 142. Pol & Ville, supra note 14, at 883. 
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theoretically capable of open and inexhaustible appropriability.
143
 Like the 
design of a pharmaceutical drug, the information embedded in the concept 
of microfinance or a protocol to reduce hospital-based infections is in 
some general sense nonrival and nonexcludable. This Article will later 
argue, however, that even though patentable technologies and social 
innovations are both formally public goods, they face different challenges 
of underproduction. Furthermore, exclusive rights are likely to play very 
different roles in motivating their creation.
144
 This Part further explores a 
host of substantive differences between innovation in the social and patent 
frameworks.  
B. Individuals and Communities 
Although innovation in the patent paradigm focuses on individual 
inventors, social innovation reveals that many creations arise more 
collectively from communal efforts. Patent law perpetuates and reifies a 
conception of invention arising from discrete, identifiable inventors.
145
 
The patent statute states that a patent application “shall include . . . the 
name of the inventor for any invention claimed in the application.”146 Of 
course, the statute also provides for granting patents to joint inventors, 
though it requires that they apply for a patent together.
147
 A group of joint 
inventors is termed an “inventive entity,” and it is treated as a discrete, 
integrated party that is independent from the human beings comprising 
it.
148
 As a doctrinal and statutory matter, the patent statute heavily 
emphasizes identifying individual inventive entities. 
 
 
 143. Cf. Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 118, at 1902 (characterizing a hospital checklist to reduce 
infections as a “classic information good”). The importance of tacit knowledge in technological and 
social innovations complicates characterizing these entities as pure public goods. Furthermore, the 
character of knowledge manifested in these domains of innovation may differ slightly. See, e.g., 
Dominique Foray & David Hargreaves, The Production of Knowledge in Different Sectors: A Model 
and Some Hypotheses, 1 LONDON REV. EDU. 7, 8 (2003) (distinguishing between the “science-in-
technology” mode of knowledge production predominant in classic technical fields and the 
“humanistic” mode of knowledge production that often plays a more important role in other sectors). 
 144. See infra Part III.A. 
 145. See Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 710 (2012) 
[hereinafter Lemley, Sole Inventor] (“[T]he patent law betrays its individual-inventor bias at various 
points, from the requirement that patents always issue to individuals rather than to companies to the 
traditional rule that the first to invent, not the first to file, is entitled to the patent.”); see generally 
ANDREW HARGADON, HOW BREAKTHROUGHS HAPPEN 93–94 (2003) (describing the “Cult of the 
Inventor” in popular conceptions of the history of technology). 
 146. 35 U.S.C. § 115(a) (2013).  
 147. 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2012). 
 148. See, e.g., In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1277 (treating a three-person group as an inventive 
entity distinct from its constituent members).  
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This focus on individual inventorship directly reflects the mechanism 
by which the patent system achieves its policy objectives; it allocates 
private property rights to enable incentives to invent and innovate. Patents 
most effectively shore up such incentives if the rewards of exclusivity 
accrue to a single owner rather than a diffuse group among whom rents 
must be split. Thus, it is imperative for patent law to identify individual 
inventors to whom it can assign exclusive rights.
149
 Individual ownership 
of patents also relates to the information efficiencies of organizing 
technological production in markets. Given that the unit of decision-
making capacity in the market is typically an individual or firm, assigning 
property rights to individual entities best enables the market transactions 
that optimize technological development. On a related note, one influential 
(though contested) justification for patents holds that granting exclusive 
rights to individual patentees enhances social efficiency by allowing the 
patentee to rationally coordinate the development of a technological 
prospect.
150
 These efficiency gains emerge from a single entity managing a 
technological resource and would be lost if a diverse group of loosely 
affiliated individuals all had claims on the invention.
151
 Ultimately, these 
considerations help inform patent law’s concern with identifying 
individual inventive entities to whom it can assign exclusive rights. 
The history of social innovations, however, reveals that new practices 
often do not arise from a single inventor. These innovations are “social” 
not only because they serve the public good but also because they emanate 
from communities.
152
 Who invented cognitive behavioral therapy? 
Although Aaron Beck and Albert Ellis played critical roles in its 
articulation, CBT has long roots dating back to the merger of behaviorism 
and the cognitive revolution.
153
 A similar story applies to microfinance. 
While social innovations are frequently associated with a single, 
charismatic leader, such as Muhammad Yunus, oftentimes “individuals are 
 
 
 149. These inventors, of course, can assign their rights to other entities (such as the firms that 
employ them), which in turn enjoy the revenue streams arising from exclusive rights. 
 150. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 
266 (1977) (articulating the “prospect theory” of patents). 
 151. Cf. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354–56 
(1967). 
 152. See A. Wren Montgomery et al., Collective Social Entrepreneurship: Collaboratively 
Shaping Social Good, 111 J. BUS. ETHICS 375, 376 (2012) (“[M]uch of social entrepreneurship 
appears, in fact, to be collaborative and collective, drawing on a broad array of support, cooperation, 
and alliances to build awareness, gain resources and, ultimately, make change.”); HARGADON, supra 
note 145, at 11; cf. Leadbeater, supra note 6, at 2; James B. Taylor, Introducing Social Innovation, 6 J. 
APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 69, 77 (1970).  
 153. See supra notes 73–79 and accompanying text. 
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the carriers of ideas rather than originators.”154 Of course, this quality of 
pluralistic inventorship is more evident when describing a social 
innovation at a high level of abstraction. Indeed, social innovations writ 
large, such as feminism and environmentalism, percolated from dozens of 
leaders and millions of individuals.
155
 In a similar sense, broad 
technological fields such as electric lighting
156
 or semiconductors also 
arose from multiple contributors as well. Nonetheless, even more discrete 
social innovations tend to arise collaboratively from communities. Indeed, 
the innovation process itself is intrinsically interactive and communicative, 
exploiting “the synergic advantages of networks and clusters.”157 As such, 
assigning inventorship to a social innovation is often an arbitrary and 
potentially distorting exercise. 
The communal nature of social innovation contrasts sharply with the 
rigid conception of individual inventorship celebrated and reified by patent 
law. Based on its very nature and purpose, patent law is preoccupied with 
identifying individual inventors. In so doing, however, it may reflect and 
corroborate a distorted perception of innovation dynamics. In fact, much 
technological innovation that qualifies for patentability also arises from 
communal origins. For instance, scientific articles often list up to a dozen 
or more coauthors, and the number of coauthors often exceeds the number 
of inventors listed on a corresponding patent.
158
 Patent law’s insistence on 
a small number of inventors appears to obscure the larger reality of group-
based invention.
159
 Studies of simultaneous invention further reveal that 
even in the technological realm, “[i]nvention appears in significant part to 
be a social, not an individual, phenomenon.”160 Mark Lemley’s account of 
technological innovation applies as well to social innovation when he 
observes that “the value of an idea often comes only after various people 
have honed and refined it in various ways.”161 And as Laura Pedraza-
Farina observes, “a sociological view of innovation emphasizes the central 
role of communities of practice in which individual inventors are 
 
 
 154. Mulgan et al., supra note 2, at 15. 
 155. Id.  
 156. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 271 (6th ed. 2013).  
 157. Mulgan et al., supra note 2, at 26. 
 158. Philippe Ducor, Coauthorship and Coinventorship, 289 SCIENCE 873, 873 (2000). 
 159.  See, e.g., Robert C. Allen, Collective Invention, 4 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1, 1–2 (1983) 
(examining collective invention in the blast furnace industry). 
 160. Lemley, Sole Inventor, supra note 145, at 711. 
 161. Id. at 714. 
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embedded.”162 Within this view, “discovery is relational, emerging from 
an iterative back-and-forth among researchers in different communities of 
practice.”163 Patent law’s insistence on individual inventors obscures the 
true communal nature of both social and technological innovation. 
C. Discrete Invention and Historical Evolution 
Social innovation also reveals the idiosyncratic nature of patent law’s 
preoccupation with discrete dates for inventive milestones. One of the 
primary requirements of patentability is novelty.
164
 For most of its history, 
the United States was a “first-to-invent” jurisdiction in which the date of 
invention was critical for determining novelty and priority.
165
 This system, 
of course, required a legal definition of invention, particularly for priority 
disputes when two parties both claimed to have invented a technology 
first. Consequently, courts determined priority by considering relative 
dates of conception
166
 (the mental aspect of invention) and reduction to 
practice
167
 (the physical aspect of invention) as well as the diligence of the 
first to conceive and the second to reduce to practice, if applicable.
168
 With 
the 2011 America Invents Act, novelty is now based on the date of filing a 
patent application, not the date of invention.
169
 Nonetheless, patent law 
maintains a strong focus on timing and sequence, particularly when 
determining which of two parties should receive a patent.  
This doctrinal edifice reflects and reifies a conception of invention as 
reducible to discrete historical milestones. This is yet another example of 
how patent law’s project of assigning individual property rights has 
influenced its conception of invention. Although two parties may have 
both contributed significantly to an invention around the same time, a 
regime of individual property rights requires assigning rights to one or the 
other, and patent law uses the doctrine of priority to determine who gets 
the patent. However, studies of social innovations reveal the difficulty of 
 
 
 162. Laura G. Pedraza-Farina, Patent Law and the Sociology of Innovation, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 
813, 820. 
 163. Id.  
 164. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 165. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 166. See Technitrol, Inc. v. United States, 440 F.2d 1362, 1369 (Ct. Cl. 1971).  
 167. See DSL Dynamic Scis. Ltd. v. Union Switch & Signal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1122, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 
1991). 
 168. In the case where one party was the first to conceive but the second to reduce an invention to 
practice, the first to conceive will prevail if she was diligent from a time prior to the other party’s 
conception through to her own reduction to practice. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2012). 
 169. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
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pinning invention dates on such creations.
170
 When was microfinance 
invented? While Muhammad Yunus has attracted significant attention, it is 
not historically accurate to say that he invented microfinance in 1976 
when he began lending to women in Bangladesh. As discussed earlier, 
microfinance has long roots stretching back to village credit associations 
and public subsidies for farmers in the mid-twentieth century.
171
 Turning 
to another example, the environmental movement has developed over 
centuries from multiple movements, including nineteenth-century efforts 
to protect landscapes, scientifically motivated calls to protect biodiversity, 
more politicized movements to oppose corporate pollution, and 
contemporary confrontational groups like Greenpeace (which itself has 
Quaker origins).
172
 Additionally, the innovation of community policing, 
which involves officers patrolling neighborhoods on foot, has roots in both 
the historical role of police officers as “night watchmen” as well as 
psychological research in the 1960s demonstrating the importance of 
maintaining aesthetic order in communities.
173
 Social innovations often go 
through many stages of development, thus making invention dates difficult 
to identify.
174
  
Notably, the arbitrary nature of assigning dates of invention to social 
innovations applies to many patentable technologies as well. As Lemley 
observes, “invention is often an incremental process, not a series of 
discrete ideas conceived in isolation.”175 All too often, “history has chosen 
to highlight the first person to make one significant step in the chain while 
ignoring the developments that precede and follow it.”176 Of course, the 
challenge of assigning inventive dates to innovations depends on the level 
of granularity at which the analysis proceeds. While it would be difficult 
to pin down an invention date for semiconductors (writ large), it is 
somewhat easier to identify dates of invention for specific developments 
in the field, such as the transitions from diodes to triodes to transistors. 
Similarly, while it is difficult to determine the invention date for 
 
 
 170. See, e.g., Rachman, supra note 75, at 4 (“It is impossible to give a precise date for the birth of 
a new form of psychological therapy but one can identify the period in which it emerged.”). 
 171. See supra notes 107–10 and accompanying text.  
 172. Mulgan et al., supra note 2, at 15. Additionally, other areas of social innovation, such as the 
feminist and disability rights movements, also have long and multifaceted histories. See id. at 14–15. 
 173. See Kelling & Wilson, supra note 23, at 33–34. 
 174. Mulgan, supra note 2, at 154. 
 175. Lemley, Sole Inventor, supra note 145, at 714; see id. at 715–16 (“[T]he vast majority of the 
most important inventions of the past two centuries . . . were themselves the result of gradual social 
processes in which multiple inventors developed the key parts of the invention at about the same 
time.”). 
 176. Id. at 714–15. 
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microfinance, it is easier to assign invention dates to particular 
developments, such as Grameen Bank’s introduction of group liability 
lending. Nonetheless, patent law reflects and perpetuates a conception of 
invention as a discrete act instead of a long, disjunctive, organic process. 
Although this simplification may be necessary to resolve priority disputes 
and grant exclusive rights to an individual party, it tends to distort the 
inventive process. 
Patent law not only insists on discreteness of inventions in time, but 
also discreteness in boundaries. All patents must “conclude with one or 
more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject 
matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.”177 
As Giles Rich famously observed, “the name of the game is the claim”;178 
claims define the effective scope of patents. Patent law’s insistence on 
claiming assumes and reinforces a notion of discrete invention in which 
clear boundaries can circumscribe technologies. The history of social 
innovation, however, shows that innovations often have fuzzy, unclear 
borders that evolve over time. What exactly is CBT? As previously 
discussed,
179
 the boundaries of traditional CBTs have stretched with the 
emergence of recent CBTs, and experts in the field debate whether 
contemporary offshoots such as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
constitute part of CBT.
180
 Here again, social innovation helps highlight a 
fundamental reality that pertains to many technologies that qualify for 
patent protection. Within patent law, there are grave concerns regarding 
the efficacy of translating novel technologies into discrete linguistic 
claims.
181
 Many of the most pressing problems in patent law, including 
patent trolls and the vagaries of software patents,
182
 are exacerbated by the 
failures of clear claiming. Ultimately, although patent law attempts to fit 
technologies into discrete, demarcated packages, both social and 
technological innovations are organic entities that resist precise definition 
and claiming.  
 
 
 177. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012); see Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 
(2014) (shoring up the requirement of claim definiteness and rejecting the Federal Circuit’s “insolubly 
ambiguous” standard). 
 178. Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims—American 
Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990). 
 179. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.  
 180. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 181. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (“Things are not 
made for the sake of words, but words for things.”). 
 182. See Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. 
REV. 905 (discussing the difficulties of ambiguous claiming in software patents). 
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D. Novelty Versus Extending What Has Already Worked 
Studies of social innovation also call into question patent law’s 
preoccupation with novelty. It seems axiomatic that an innovation must be 
new, an intuition captured in patent law’s novelty requirement.183 Novelty 
is assessed relative to the prior art, the repository of all publicly accessible 
knowledge existing at a given time, such as the date of invention or the 
date of filing a patent application.
184
 Courts have developed a large body 
of doctrine to define both prior art and novelty, and the standard for 
achieving novelty can be quite demanding. Rather obscure prior art 
references, such as an oil company’s practice of searching for 
hydrocarbons in a remote area outside of Palestine, Texas,
185
 or a 
dissertation filed and indexed in a university library in Germany,
186
 have 
been found to destroy the novelty of later claimed inventions.  
However, many highly valuable social innovations are not strictly 
novel in a patent sense.
187
 They may be “new” in that they have only 
recently achieved prominence,
188
 but their value lies in applying and 
extending what has already been done. This notion is manifested, for 
example, in Benjamin Franklin’s advocacy of paving and lighting of 
public streets; the idea for this social innovation already existed, but 
Franklin was the one who made it a reality.
189
 As Michael Mumford 
observes, “innovation may depend as much on recognizing a good idea 
when it presents itself as initial generation of the idea.”190 
A prominent kind of nonnovel social innovation is captured in the 
concept of positive deviance. Although “deviance” normally has a 
negative connotation, positive defiance refers to the presence of 
extraordinarily good outcomes at one end of a normal distribution of 
 
 
 183. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 184.  See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 156, at 340–41. 
 185. Rosaire v. Baroid Sales Div., Nat’l Lead Co., 218 F.2d 72, 72–74 (5th Cir. 1955).  
 186. In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 187. This also appears to be true of more traditional technologies that have been subject to patent 
protection. See, e.g., HARGADON, supra note 145, at 24 (describing how Edison’s inventions were 
actually constructive assimilations of existing technologies). 
 188. See Phills Jr. et al., supra note 3, at 37–38 (identifying the two key characteristics of a social 
innovation as novelty and improvement). 
 189. Mumford, supra note 2, at 259–60. 
 190. Id. at 260. Of course, there are significant pressures within the social innovation field to 
develop and fund novel initiatives, sometimes at the expense of existing programs with demonstrated 
success. Joanna Jacobson, Has Venture Philanthropy Passed Its Peak?, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., 
Feb. 26, 2013, http://www.ssireview.org/blog/entry/has_venture_philanthropy_passed_its_peak. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss1/5
  
 
 
 
 
2014] SOCIAL INNOVATION 33 
 
 
 
 
behaviors.
191
 These outliers, which “positively deviate” from the mean, 
represent promising candidates for replication. Positive deviance achieved 
prominence in the 1970s, when public health advocates started designing 
interventions around “uncommon, beneficial health behaviours that 
community members already practised.”192 A particularly visible example 
in more recent times concerns the challenge of alleviating childhood 
malnutrition in Vietnam.
193
 Researchers surveyed poor families in local 
communities and found some whose children were unusually well-
nourished.
194
 They observed that parents of such children supplemented 
their diets with shrimp, crabs, and snails from rice paddies. Most 
community members considered these foods unsafe for children and 
avoided them. Positively deviant families also fed their children multiple 
smaller meals, which allowed small stomachs to digest more food every 
day. Furthermore, contrary to local wisdom, these families fed their 
children even when they had diarrhea, and they washed their children’s 
hands before they ate.
195
 Based on these findings, researchers encouraged 
similar practices among other community members. By the end of the 
program’s first year, eighty percent of enrolled children were adequately 
nourished, compared to a baseline of thirty-five percent prior to the 
program’s start.196 Vietnamese authorities ultimately replicated the 
program in 250 communities.
197
 
Positive deviance reflects a form of innovation that encompasses 
extending what already works.
198
 Such approaches have “helped to reduce 
rates of female genital mutilation in Egypt, improved prisons in Denmark, 
helped the mentally ill in Pittsburgh . . . and cut infections in Veterans 
 
 
 191. See Tim Brown & Jocelyn Wyatt, Design Thinking for Social Innovation, STAN. SOC. 
INNOVATION REV., Winter 2010, at 31, 32; Gretchen M. Spreitzer & Scott Sonenshein, Toward the 
Construct Definition of Positive Deviance, 47 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 828, 828–30 (2004) (considering 
positive deviance in the context of positive organizational studies); Mulgan, supra note 2, at 150 
(discussing positive deviants). 
 192. David R. Marsh et al., The Power of Positive Deviance, 329 BRIT. MED. J. 1177, 1177 
(2004). 
 193. Id. at 1177–78; Lindberg et al., supra note 130, at 61. 
 194. Rosenberg, supra note 134. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See Brown & Wyatt, supra note 191, at 31–32; see also Monique Sternin et al., Rapid, 
Sustained Childhood Malnutrition Alleviation Through a Positive-Deviance Approach to Rural 
Vietnam: Preliminary Findings, in HEARTH NUTRITION MODEL: APPLICATIONS IN HAITI, VIETNAM, 
AND BANGLADESH 59 (1997). 
 197. Rosenberg, supra note 134. 
 198. Casasnovas & Bruno, supra note 43, at 174 (“[I]nnovative solutions usually start in a local 
area, but as problems are often more global, replicating successful initiatives in other settings is often 
an attractive scaling strategy.”). 
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Affairs hospitals across the United States.”199 One benefit of solutions 
arising from positive deviance is that “because they come from within, 
these solutions are less likely to be rejected as impractical, too difficult or 
inappropriate for a particular institution’s culture.”200 This form of social 
innovation thus captures the ingenuity behind how individuals “improvise 
their way through their daily lives.”201  
Positive deviance reflects another aspect of a significant amount of 
social innovation—it is user generated.202 As Eric von Hippel, Katherine 
Strandburg, and others have demonstrated, users (rather than commercial 
producers) are a significant source of innovation in areas as diverse as 
scientific instrumentation, semiconductors, circuit boards, and mountain 
biking.
203
 Such is the case with many innovations arising from positive 
deviance, in which individuals facing a challenge (such as malnutrition) 
develop and extend solutions to address their own needs. In this vein, 
EMUDE (Emerging User Demands for Sustainable Solutions) is a project 
of the European Commission that recognizes “groups of active, 
enterprising people inventing and putting into practice original ways of 
dealing with everyday problems.”204 Studies of leading social innovations 
reveal that they commonly “focus explicitly on mobilizing existing assets 
of marginalized groups to improve their lives, rather than delivering 
outside resources and services.”205 User-generated innovation reflects both 
the communal nature of creativity as well as the fact that much valuable 
innovation simply involves expanding existing practices. 
E. Invention Versus Implementation, Replication, and Extension 
On a related note, patent law’s conception of innovation focuses much 
more on invention rather than the implementation, replication, and 
 
 
 199. Rosenberg, supra note 134. 
 200. Shaw, supra note 115, at 3. 
 201. Brown & Wyatt, supra note 191, at 33. 
 202. See David Bornstein, The Rise of the Social Entrepreneur, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2012), 
available at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/13/the-rise-of-social-entrepreneur/?_php= 
true&_type=blogs&_r=0; Trisha Greenhalgh et al., Diffusion of Innovation in Service Organizations: 
Systematic Review and Recommendations, 82 MILBANK Q. 581, 604 (2004). 
 203. See, e.g., Eric von Hippel, Users as Innovators, in THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION 11 (1988); 
Christian Lüthje et al., User-Innovators and “Local” Information: The Case of Mountain Biking, 34 
RES. POL’Y 951, 951–52 (2005); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent 
Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 469 (2008). 
 204. Publishable Final Activity Report, EMUDE 1 (2004), http://cordis.europa.eu/documents/ 
documentlibrary/126376051EN6.pdf [hereinafter EMUDE, Final Activity Report]; see also OECD, 
FOSTERING INNOVATION, supra note 13, at 12.  
 205. Alvord et al., supra note 47, at 270. 
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extension of new technologies.
206
 As the novelty requirement reveals, 
patent law has long emphasized early-stage milestones such as the date of 
invention or the date of filing a patent application.
207
 At a deeper 
conceptual level, patent law most directly rewards invention, not 
innovation (in the patent sense of the term). Indeed, one can get a patent 
without even building a working prototype of an invention.
208
 How then 
do patented technologies, which may be fairly embryonic, become 
commercial products? Patent law is largely silent on this issue, as it 
implicitly relies on market incentives to motivate either further in-house 
development or licensing of a patent to downstream entities for 
commercialization.
209
 To be sure, well-established patent theory holds that 
exclusive rights provide incentives not only to invent but to innovate as 
well.
210
 However, the guiding assumption is that once patent rights are 
granted over some early-stage invention, the market will “work[] its 
wonders”211 to allocate resources for further development and 
dissemination.
212
 
As studies of social innovation reveal, however, oftentimes the real 
value of innovation is not the initial invention, but the implementation, 
replication, and extension of an existing creation.
213
 A conventional 
economic perspective assuming rational behavior and utility maximization 
presumes that actors will naturally adopt a superior innovation once it 
exists.
214
 In reality, however, there are significant barriers to 
 
 
 206. Cf. John F. Duffy, Reviving the Paper Patent Doctrine, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1359, 1361 
(2013) (noting contemporary doctrine in which mere disclosure of an invention—rather than actually 
practicing it—provides the theoretical justification for granting exclusive rights). 
 207. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). These citations reflect novelty 
provisions of the patent statute both before and after passage of the AIA. 
 208. See, e.g., Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 
1986). Indeed, certain aspects of patent law, such as public use statutory bars, provide an incentive for 
inventors to patent very early-stage inventions. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); Christopher A. 
Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 72–82 (2009); Ted M. 
Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 343 (2010).  
 209. Cf. F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 697, 703 (2001) 
 210. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1037. 
 211. Cf. Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 
38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 595, 598 (2000).  
 212. Lee, Tacit Dimension, supra note 138, at 1513–14. 
    213. See Jeffrey L. Bradach, Going to Scale: The Challenge of Replicating Social Programs, 
STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Spring 2003, at 19, 19 (“Nearly every problem has been solved by 
someone, somewhere. . . . [However,] we can’t seem to replicate [those solutions] anywhere else.”) 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Bill Clinton). 
 214. George J. Papagiannis et al., Toward a Political Economy of Educational Innovation, 52 
REV. EDUC. RES. 245, 260 (1982); HARGADON, supra note 145, at 27 (describing the common 
misperception that “good ideas will sell themselves”). 
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implementation and adoption, including learning costs and institutional 
inertia. These barriers, moreover, may be particularly acute for social 
innovations because of their tendency to implicate changes in human and 
institutional behavior. For instance, the leveraging of positive deviance to 
fight childhood malnutrition in Vietnam illustrated to one researcher that 
“‘[k]nowledge doesn’t change behavior . . . . Practice changes 
behavior.’”215 Compared to new technologies,  
a new social form is not introduced so easily. An innovative kind of 
school, a new way of dealing with poverty, a new procedure for 
resocializing delinquents, a new technique for rehabilitating the 
schizophrenic—all are likely to disrupt complex and valued roles, 
identities, and skills. The disruption may have widespread and 
ramifying effects, so that whole communities may be challenged 
and angered.
216
 
Accordingly, it is critical to prototype, test, iterate, and refine social 
innovations in real-world situations.
217
 Indeed, the UK’s National Health 
Service, which provides comprehensive health and rehabilitation services 
to residents, took forty years to move from idea to reality.
218
 And studies 
of educational innovation reveal that “neglect of implementation issues is 
perhaps the major cause of the failure of innovative projects.”219 Bringing 
social innovations to life involves considerable testing and failure.
220
  
Endemic to implementing, replicating, and extending social 
innovations is overcoming human and institutional resistance to change.
221
 
Perceptions of an innovation’s consistency with existing values and 
beliefs, characteristics of prospective adopters, and contextual factors can 
all affect the success and speed of dissemination.
222
 In this regard, 
conducting demonstration projects
223
 and embedding new innovations 
within a relevant user community are often critical to successful 
 
 
 215. Rosenberg, supra note 134. 
 216. Taylor, supra note 152, at 70.  
 217. See Brown & Wyatt, supra note 191, at 35; Mumford & Moertl, supra note 15, at 263. 
 218. Mulgan et al., supra note 2, at 23. 
 219. Papagiannis, supra note 214, at 247. 
 220. Mulgan, supra note 2, at 151–52. 
 221. Mulgan et al., supra note 2, at 4 (“In all cases, innovation usually involves some struggle 
against vested interests.”). See, e.g., Donald M. Berwick, Disseminating Innovations in Health Care, 
289 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1969, 1970 (2003) (observing that it took 264 years from the discovery that 
certain foods prevented scurvy to official British policy applying that finding in medical treatments for 
sailors). 
 222. Id. at 1970–73. 
 223. Mumford & Moertl, supra note 15, at 263. 
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development and dissemination.
224
 This is evident, for example, in social 
innovations built around positive deviance, which, by definition, extend 
existing practices from some members of a community to others.
225
 One 
meta-study of the diffusion of innovations in social organizations found 
that they spread more rapidly when they are clearly advantageous, 
compatible with existing norms, simple, available for use on a trial basis, 
observable, adaptable to local needs, codified, and available with 
additional support.
226
 All of these factors help overcome intrinsic 
resistance to change. 
Moving beyond implementation in a local context, these human and 
institutional challenges are exacerbated in attempts to expand social 
innovations to new contexts.
227
 Difficulties of dissemination appear to be 
particularly acute in the health care field;
228
 studies have shown that 
improvements to obstetrics, asthma treatment, suturing, and antibiotic use 
that arose in one part of an integrated health care system did not spread to 
other parts.
229
 The tacit, “humanistic” knowledge embodied in many social 
innovations often requires interpersonal interaction to transfer.
230
  
In this sense, social innovations diverge quite sharply from patent law’s 
conception of readily and objectively reproducible technology. The central 
quid pro quo of the patent system involves an exchange of exclusive rights 
for technical disclosure.
231
 A patent must enable a “person of ordinary skill 
in the art” (“PHOSITA”) to make and use an invention232 as well as 
adequately describe the invention.
233
 Among other objectives, these 
disclosure requirements seek to make patented inventions objectively 
reproducible. They depersonalize inventions by making the subjective 
contents of the inventor’s mind publicly accessible. As such, a patent 
severs the tie between an inventor and an invention. In theory, a 
PHOSITA seeking to practice an invention need not have any direct 
 
 
 224. See, e.g., Kanter, supra note 20, at 129–30; Charles A. Gardner et al., Technological and 
Social Innovation: A Unifying New Paradigm for Global Health, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 2007, at 
1052, 1055 (“[S]ocial innovations almost always require adaptation to local conditions.”).  
 225. Marsh et al., supra note 192, at 1177. 
 226. Greenhalgh et al., supra note 202, at 594–98. 
 227. See Mulgan, supra note 2, at 153; Let’s Hear Those Ideas, ECONOMIST, Aug. 12, 2010, at 55. 
 228. Berwick, supra note 221, at 1970 (“In health care, invention is hard, but dissemination is 
even harder.”). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Foray & Hargreaves, supra note 143, at 9 
 231. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 156, at 259–60. 
 232. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
 233. Id. Additionally, although its importance has weakened in recent patent reform, it is still a 
formal requirement that a patent disclose any “best mode” known to the inventor for practicing an 
invention. Id. 
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relationship with the inventor; she need only read the patent. Such 
disclosure thus renders replicating the invention a fairly easy task. 
Many social innovations, however, are far from objectively 
reproducible in this manner. They do not represent discrete, packageable 
technologies that are easily separated from their creators. Rather, they 
spread more like buds or grafts with a direct connection to the original 
innovation or innovator. Social innovations are often embedded in 
programs and organizations, and Gregory Dees and his colleagues provide 
a useful typology of various organizational modalities for spreading such 
innovations.
234
 First, dissemination occurs when a social entrepreneur 
provides information and technical assistance to others. This is the case 
with KaBOOM!, a nonprofit that builds and rehabilitates playgrounds, 
which provides online tools, publications, and training to those seeking to 
replicate their program.
235
 Second, affiliation involves a formal 
relationship between organizations within a network. For example, Social 
Venture Partners began as a single entity in Seattle that connected 
philanthropists with nonprofits and has since grown into an international 
network of organizations.
236
 Finally, branching involves creating new sites 
within an existing organization. For example, the Nature Conservancy is a 
Virginia-based environmental organization with fully integrated offices in 
all fifty states and twenty-two foreign countries.
237
 A consistent pattern of 
all of these diffusion models is some direct connection to the original 
social innovation or entrepreneur. 
A related principle that applies to the spread of social innovation is the 
importance of networks.
238
 When social innovations first emerge, they 
usually do so in small groups characterized by close geographic or social 
links.
239
 Modeling work shows that if agents involved in social innovation 
are clustered in enclaves with strong internal connections, knowledge 
transfer proceeds very quickly.
240
 One route for scaling up a social 
 
 
 234. J. Gregory Dees et al., Scaling Social Impact: Strategies for Spreading Social Innovations, 
STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Spring 2004, at 24, 28. Other commentators distinguish between 
“diffusion (passive spread)” and “dissemination (active and planned efforts to persuade target groups 
to adopt an innovation).” See, e.g., Greenhalgh et al., supra note 202, at 582. 
 235. Dees et al., supra note 234, at 28. 
 236. Id. at 29. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Cf. WALTERS, supra note 137, at 27 (“[M]any of the innovations that show strong replicative 
powers are in program or policy areas where there are ‘established, strong national networks of 
practitioners.’”). 
 239. Young, supra note 15, at 21285. Even architecture plays a role here, as organizations whose 
buildings encourage hallway chats may experience faster dissemination of novel practices. Berwick, 
supra note 221, at 1972. 
 240. Young, supra note 15, at 21286. 
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innovation involves connecting the “bees” (i.e., small, agile social 
entrepreneurs) with the “trees” (i.e., larger, more established entities that 
can expand existing innovations).
241
 Trees may lack the creativity to 
develop their own social innovations, but they are highly proficient in 
implementation and extension.
242
 Indeed, “connectors” who link “people, 
ideas, money, and power” play a particularly important role in spreading 
social innovations.
243
 Far from a model of objective, independent 
reproducibility, diffusion of social innovations frequently requires robust 
networks of interaction. 
In highlighting the challenges of implementation, replication, and 
extension as well as the importance of networks, social innovation may 
simply illustrate general facets of innovation (including technological 
development) that patent law often obscures. This is evident, for example, 
in the health care field, which spans both social innovations (as herein 
characterized) and traditional, patentable technologies: “The problem of 
dissemination of change applies not only to formally studied bioscientific 
innovations, but also to the numerous effective process innovations that 
arise from improvement projects . . . in local settings, pilot sites, and 
progressive organizations.”244 Indeed, there is a wide literature on the 
difficulties of developing and commercializing patented technologies; 
some scholars have even proposed “commercialization patents” or 
“innovation warrants” to motivate postinvention development of new 
technologies.
245
 Indeed, in the history of technology, oftentimes the real 
value (and historical credit) for an invention arises not with the inventor, 
but with the individual who implemented or refined it in a substantial way. 
For example, the idea of the telegraph existed before Samuel Morse (the 
nominal “inventor” of that technology) introduced the application of 
electromagnets to increase signal strength.
246
 Furthermore, particularly for 
relatively early-stage, embryonic inventions, a patent disclosure that 
satisfies the enablement and written description requirements may 
nonetheless fail to disclose valuable tacit knowledge in the inventor’s 
 
 
 241. Mulgan et al., supra note 2, at 5; see also OECD, FOSTERING INNOVATION, supra note 13, at 
23. 
 242. Mulgan et al., supra note 2, at 20. 
 243. Id. at 5. 
 244. Berwick, supra note 221, at 1970. 
 245. Sichelman, supra note 208, at 341 (proposing commercialization patents); William Kingston, 
Innovation Needs Patents Reform, 30 RES. POL’Y 403 (2001) (proposing innovation warrants); see 
also Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 
1065 (2007) (proposing an auction system for extending patent terms to promote commercialization). 
 246. Lemley, Sole Inventor, supra note 145, at 719–20. 
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mind that is highly relevant for implementing, replicating, and extending 
an invention.
247
 Networks and personal interactions are critical to diffusing 
such tacit knowledge and developing patented technologies.
248
  
In sum, patent law’s focus on invention may often obscure the real 
value and challenge of developing and spreading an innovation. Although 
creating a new technology or social idea is certainly important, 
implementation, replication, and extension do not simply happen 
automatically. Implementing an innovation and spreading it in ways that 
overcome human and institutional resistance to change are essentially 
social endeavors that require a high degree of personal touch.  
F. The Charismatic Entrepreneur 
On a related note, patent law’s project of “objectifying” inventions 
obscures the important role of an inventor or entrepreneur in propagating a 
new innovation. As mentioned, patent law’s requirement of technical 
disclosure aims to depersonalize technology, divorcing the invention from 
the inventor.
249
 However, related to the importance of human interactions 
in social innovation, the charismatic entrepreneur plays a central role in 
developing and diffusing new social practices.
250
 At first glance, this 
phenomenon may seem to be at odds with the earlier observation that most 
social innovations do not have identifiable inventors but evolve 
organically from communal efforts. However, both elements play critical 
roles in social innovation: a community of contributors as well as 
charismatic entrepreneurs who can coalesce, coordinate, and publicize 
such efforts to bring new ideas to fruition.
251
 
Certainly, history is speckled with enterprising social entrepreneurs 
who have literally changed the world. Well-known figures include Robert 
Owen, the British pioneer of cooperatively run factories, and Muhammad 
Yunus, the celebrated founder of Grameen Bank.
252
 Lesser-known social 
entrepreneurs include Norma Hotaling, a former prostitute and “outside 
gadfly as change agent” who spearheaded the First Offender Prostitution 
 
 
 247. See Lee, Tacit Dimension, supra note 138, at 1523–24. 
 248. Id. at 1547. 
 249.  See supra Part II.E.  
 250. Mulgan, supra note 2, at 148; see Bornstein, supra note 202.  
 251. Cf. Montgomery et al., supra note 152, at 375–76 (recognizing the role of both individual 
entrepreneurs and “outside actors, stakeholders, networks, organizations, and institutions” in 
propagating social innovations). 
 252. Mulgan, supra note 2, at 148; see Martin & Osberg, supra note 19, at 30 (comparing Yunus 
to Steve Jobs); Let’s Hear Those Ideas, supra note 227, at 55 (characterizing Yunus as probably the 
best known social entrepreneur). 
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Program.
253
 In a broad sense, social innovation is a “people-driven 
business,”254 and personalities matter. Social innovation requires 
individuals of visionary leadership “who are unusually skilled at the art of 
persuasion.”255 Indeed, replication of a social innovation may be difficult 
when it is divorced from the personality of a charismatic entrepreneur.
256
 
Related to the importance of networks in propagating social innovations, 
leaders have a high degree of “bridging capacity” to connect a diverse set 
of people, institutions, and resources.
257
 Sometimes an outsider is the 
catalyst for social change, as in the case of Hotaling. In other situations, 
leadership from an established authority figure can help overcome 
opposition to a disruptive innovation.
258
 For example, the development of 
scientific management as well as standardized testing for college 
admissions arose not from outsiders, but from individuals with 
longstanding involvement in the field.
259
 
Notably, scholars have also recognized the importance of charismatic 
leaders (who may or may not be inventors) in disseminating scientific and 
technological advances.
260
 Frequently, the person whom history extols as 
the “inventor” of some technology is in fact the shrewd entrepreneur who 
commercialized it and brought it to scale. For example, Thomas Edison 
did not actually invent the light bulb, but he was extraordinarily successful 
in commercializing it.
261
 Similarly, Henry Ford did not invent the 
automobile but developed a manufacturing process to accelerate its 
production.
262
 In many instances, the initial inventors are rather bad at 
commercializing their inventions, perhaps because they did not fully 
appreciate their potential.
263
 Similarly, a social entrepreneur’s value may 
come not in formulating a new idea, but expanding and amplifying an 
existing idea.  
 
 
 253. WALTERS, supra note 137, at 15, 35. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.  
 254. WALTERS, supra note 137, at 34. 
 255. Mumford & Moertl, supra note 15, at 264. 
 256. Cf. Dees et al., supra note 234, at 30. 
 257. Alvord et al., supra note 47, at 271–74. 
 258. Gigi Georges & Tim Glynn Burke, Disruptive Logic: A New Paradigm for Social Change, 
SOC. SPACE, 2011, at 93, available at http://www.innovations.harvard.edu/cache/documents/21111/ 
2111123.pdf.  
 259. Mumford & Moertl, supra note 15, at 262. 
 260. See Robert K. Merton, The Matthew Effect in Science, 159 SCIENCE 56 (1968).  
 261. HARGADON, supra note 145, at 7; Lemley, Sole Inventor, supra note 145, at 723. 
 262. Id. at 724–25. But see HARGADON, supra note 145, at 43 (noting that Ford’s assembly line 
was not necessarily novel). 
 263. Id. at 742. In some cases, though, inventors play an important role in championing their 
creations, compelling parties to further develop and commercialize them. See Lee, Tacit Dimension, 
supra note 138, at 1532–33. 
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G. Toward a More Holistic Conception of Innovation 
Empirical accounts of social innovation reveal a very different 
conception of innovation than that embedded in patent law. The patent 
paradigm casts invention as the discrete, individualistic creation of 
something new, which the patentee makes objectively reproducible 
through codification. It pays less attention to the challenges of 
implementing, replicating, and extending that creation as well as the 
importance of human and institutional factors in those endeavors. Much 
social innovation, however, emerges from long processes of communal 
development, and the resulting creation is amorphous and evolves 
constantly. Oftentimes, the innovation is not strictly novel, but its real 
value lies in spreading an existing idea. Furthermore, innovation is 
essentially a human, social process in which some kind of contact with the 
original innovator greatly accelerates the spread of new practices.  
A consistent theme arising from this analysis is that the unique policy 
mechanisms of patent law lead to a rather narrow conception of 
protectable innovation. Patent law’s project of assigning individual 
exclusive rights to inventions, thus enabling functioning markets for 
technology, requires identifying individual inventors to receive those 
rights. It also requires identifying specific inventive milestones so as to 
resolve priority disputes between competing inventors, and it mandates 
that patentees attempt to claim inventions as discrete, bounded 
technologies. The market orientation of patents also seeks to sever the link 
between inventor and invention through robust public disclosure. 
Furthermore, confidence in the market helps explain the patent system’s 
preoccupation with invention rather than implementation, replication, and 
extension, which will presumably unfold through voluntary market 
exchanges. The patent system is designed to enable market incentives to 
drive technological innovation, and it consequently views innovation 
through the lens of exclusive rights. Other forms of innovation beyond the 
patent paradigm, however, require very different mechanisms of 
promotion, a topic to which this Article now turns. 
III. ACCELERATING SOCIAL INNOVATION 
Turning from the descriptive to the prescriptive, this Part draws from 
the prior analysis to propose various strategies for accelerating social 
innovation. In so doing, it fills a gap in the innovation literature, which 
overwhelmingly focuses on promoting “traditional” technological 
innovation protectable by patents. Accordingly, this Part builds upon a 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss1/5
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rich body of scholarship comparing the relative merits of exclusive rights, 
public funding, prizes, and other inducement mechanisms to promote 
innovation.
264
 These analyses, moreover, provide a framework for 
selecting one or several of these mechanisms to promote particular kinds 
of social innovations within particular contexts. While this Part argues 
against extending intellectual property rights to social innovations, it 
argues that selective provision of public and private funding, prizes, social 
capital markets, and infrastructure, as well as insights from the theory of 
the firm, user innovation, and commons-based peer production, can all 
accelerate social innovation. 
A. The Inappropriateness of Exclusive Rights 
Of course, one obvious candidate for accelerating social innovation is 
to extend exclusive rights over such creations, much like the patent system 
grants exclusive rights over technologies. For a variety of reasons, 
however, this Article argues against such a potential policy intervention. 
Before addressing this question, however, it is worthwhile to consider the 
antecedent issue of whether most social innovations are even patentable.  
It is doubtful that many social innovations would satisfy the threshold 
requirements of patent eligibility. Patentable subject matter encompasses 
“any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter,”265 and courts have long construed these categories expansively.266 
Perhaps the most likely route to patenting many social innovations would 
be to claim them as business methods, which courts have held may 
comprise patentable subject matter.
267
 For example, one could attempt to 
claim a process for increasing job opportunities by providing free voice 
mail to indigent individuals
268
 as a business method. However, since, the 
high water mark of patent eligibility in the late 1990s, courts have recently 
construed patentable subject matter—including business methods—more 
 
 
 264. See, e.g., Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. 
Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347 (2000); Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore 
Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303 (2012); Kapczynski, supra note 9; 
Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 118; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual 
Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693 (2008); Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: 
Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 691 (1983). 
 265. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2011).  
 266. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (“In choosing such expansive terms 
as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly 
contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.”). 
 267. See, e.g., State Street Bank v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 268.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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narrowly.
269
 For example, in Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court 
reinvigorated the “abstract idea” exception to patentable subject matter in 
rejecting claims to a method of hedging risks in commodities trading.
270
 
These decisions cast some doubt on the patent eligibility of social 
innovations claimed as business methods, particularly if done so at a high 
level of abstraction. For instance, a claim to a process of providing loans 
to indigent individuals to fund revenue-generating activities would likely 
fail as impermissibly abstract.
271
 
Notwithstanding potential difficulties of patentable subject matter, 
other requirements of patentability, such as novelty and nonobviousness, 
would also represent formidable obstacles. As mentioned, many social 
innovations are not strictly new but represent extensions or adaptations of 
existing practices.
272
 For example, an attempt to patent techniques related 
to microfinance may fail on novelty and nonobviousness grounds. Even an 
innovation that might technically be novel, such as Grameen Bank’s 
process of group lending,
273
 would likely face significant nonobviousness 
hurdles.
274
 Similarly, an attempt to patent simple strategies for preventing 
MRSA infections, such as not wearing neckties or degowning into a glove, 
would also likely fail on nonobviousness grounds.  
Further complicating attempts to patent social innovations is the public, 
open nature of such creations. Within the United States’ first-inventor-to-
file system, if an inventor publicly discloses an invention more than a year 
before filing a patent application, he will destroy his own invention’s 
novelty.
275
 As previously mentioned, social entrepreneurs typically do not 
keep their innovations secret, and in fact they aim to publicize and 
 
 
 269. Compare State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373 (equating patentable subject matter with anything 
that produces “a useful, concrete and tangible result”), with In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1347 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007) (denying the patent eligibility of electronic signals), and In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 
1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (denying the patent eligibility of certain claims covering a method of 
arbitrating legal disputes). See also John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. 
L. REV. 1139, 1181 (1999) (criticizing State Street’s expansive conception of patentable subject 
matter). 
 270. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).  
 271.  Cf. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (articulating a two-part 
test for determining whether a claimed invention covers an abstract idea). 
 272. See supra notes 191–201 and accompanying text.  
 273. See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text.  
 274. The Supreme Court recently articulated a more stringent nonobviousness requirement. See 
KSR Int’l v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2006) (“When there is a design need or market pressure 
to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of 
ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this 
leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and 
common sense.”). 
 275. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(A) (2011). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss1/5
  
 
 
 
 
2014] SOCIAL INNOVATION 45 
 
 
 
 
disseminate them rapidly.
276
 Unless this practice were coupled with a norm 
of quickly filing patent applications (which seems highly unlikely), it 
would tend to defeat attempts to patent social innovations.  
Even if social innovations were patentable, exclusive rights would not 
be a prudent policy instrument for promoting them. Patents (in theory) 
represent an intrinsic tradeoff: they enhance incentives to invent but at the 
cost of constraining access to existing creations. In the context of social 
innovations, the benefits of patent protection would be almost nonexistent 
and the costs would be highly deleterious. On the benefits side, patents 
resolve market failure by granting patentees a right to exclude others from 
using their inventions, thus shoring up incentives to invent. Although 
patents enable market incentives to motivate inventors to invent, they do 
not create market incentives; it is ultimately market demand that drives the 
generation of patented technologies. Here, the patent paradigm fails to 
translate to social innovations, for almost by definition, there is relatively 
little market demand for such innovations. That is, even assuming strict 
excludability (which is a dubious assumption), patenting a social 
innovation would be unlikely to generate significant revenues and thus 
incentives for creation. If Springwire attempted to charge patent-inflated 
prices for community voice mail,
277
 homeless individuals would simply 
stop using the service, and no other organizations would likely license the 
patent.  
Additionally, even if exclusive rights provided significant financial 
remuneration (which they probably do not), such incentives are not 
particularly germane to most social innovations. As noted, the motivations 
underlying social innovations are generally altruistic, aimed at advancing 
the public interest rather than maximizing income.
278
 In particular, for 
user-generated social innovations, the challenge of an individual 
confronting an everyday, real-world problem provides ample motivation to 
create an innovative solution. As such, profit motives would provide 
relatively little marginal incentive for creating social innovations.  
Furthermore, exclusive rights on social innovations are plagued by 
difficulties of monitoring and enforcement. As others have described, 
monitoring processes is much more difficult than monitoring the 
manufacture and sale of products.
279
 Many social innovations, such as 
hand-washing protocols to prevent MRSA infections, are processes. If 
 
 
 276. See supra Part I.A.  
 277.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 278. There are, however, exceptions and mixed cases. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 279. Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 118, at 1920. 
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such innovations were subject to exclusive rights, patentees would face 
significant challenges in identifying infringement and bringing 
enforcement actions, which would further depress incentives to patent in 
the first place. 
Additionally, the perceived informational benefits of utilizing patents 
and markets to allocate resources for innovation would not apply to social 
innovations. A classic argument in favor of patents over public funding of 
technological development is that market exchanges create price signals 
that allocate resources for invention more efficiently than centralized 
planning.
280
 As F.A. Hayek influentially described, the information needed 
to create an optimal economic order is widely dispersed throughout 
society and is very difficult to concentrate within a single entity, such as a 
government body.
281
 For Hayek, the best system for dynamically 
exploiting such distributed information is the market.
282
 By aggregating 
information from millions of actors, the price system ensures the most 
efficient allocation of resources in society. The information efficiency of 
markets is thus an underappreciated link that justifies a patent system over 
other approaches (such as broad public funding) to subsidize research and 
development. However, the perceived information advantage of prices 
does not hold in all contexts; in particular, patents “fare poorly when 
market signals are weak proxies for social value.”283 This is the case with 
many social innovations; there may be enormous social demand for 
strategies to reduce homelessness, but this is not translated into 
commensurate market demand because of the low purchasing power of the 
individuals who value this innovation. Because prices reflect market rather 
than social value, the perceived informational advantage of markets is 
largely inapposite to social innovations.  
While the benefits of patent protection would largely be absent for 
social innovations, the costs would be significant. At a fundamental level, 
the exclusivity of patents would defeat the purpose and character of most 
social innovations. Exclusive rights produce deadweight loss,
284
 which is 
particularly deleterious for innovations aimed at low-income populations 
with very little purchasing power. Furthermore, extending patent rights to 
 
 
 280. Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 11–14 
(1969); see Kapczynski, supra note 9, at 974–75 (describing and criticizing this argument). 
 281. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519 (1945).  
 282. Id. at 525–26 (“Fundamentally, in a system where the knowledge of the relevant facts is 
dispersed among many people, prices can act to coordinate the separate actions of different people.”). 
 283. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 264, at 328. 
 284. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 16–21 (2003); Kapczynski, supra note 9, at 982. 
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social innovations could “crowd out” more altruistic efforts, thus resulting 
in no net increase—and perhaps a decrease—in social innovations.285 
Additionally, it is possible that profit motives would change the nature of 
social innovations, perhaps for the worse. Along these lines, studies of 
blood donation reveal no increase in the overall supply of blood when it 
was available for purchase.
286
 Furthermore, “sold” blood was of lower 
quality than donated blood.
287
 Extrapolating from these studies, it appears 
that introducing profit motives in domains traditionally governed by 
altruism may actually undermine efforts to serve the public interest. For a 
variety of reasons, extending exclusive rights to social innovations would 
be ineffective and ill advised.
288
 
B. Funding 
1. Government Grants and Social Capital Markets 
Exclusive rights, however, are far from the exclusive mechanism for 
promoting innovation.
289
 Several other approaches would bear significant 
fruit, and a robust literature has developed addressing the comparative 
merits of various inducement mechanisms.
290
 Social innovation demands 
significant sums of money,
291
 and governments at many levels should 
consider expanding their funding of such endeavors. Public funding 
 
 
 285. See Bruno S. Frey & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical 
Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 746, 746 (1997) (presenting a theory 
stipulating that “intrinsic motivation is partially destroyed when price incentives are introduced”). 
 286. RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 
245–46 (1971). 
 287. Id. 
 288.  Although this discussion has argued against patenting social innovations, one should 
acknowledge that other forms of intellectual property protection, such as trademark, may play a 
salutary role in promoting and disseminating such creations. As commentators have observed, certain 
forms of “open” innovation may be more dependent on intellectual property rights than initially meets 
the eye. See Dreyfuss, Does IP need IP?, supra note 60, at 1448–52. As previously discussed, in the 
social innovation sphere, organizations often license their creations and utilize a franchising model to 
disseminate them, which suggests that trademark law may be helpful in generating and spreading such 
innovations. See supra notes 234–37 and accompanying text. Social enterprises that do not seek to 
maximize profits may nevertheless desire the recognition of developing a new innovation as well as 
the ability to influence how it is disseminated, both of which would be facilitated by trademark. 
 289. It bears emphasizing that the case for exclusive rights to promote the technologies that 
traditionally fall within the ambit of patent protection is also debatable. See Gallini & Scotchmer, 
supra note 140, at 53 (“Arrow explained why some incentive scheme is needed, but not which 
scheme.”). 
 290. See supra note 264. 
 291. See, e.g., Mulgan et al., supra note 2, at 37 (“An equivalent mix of funding sources is needed 
for social innovation, for experiments, start ups and then for growth.”). 
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directly subsidizes such social innovations without subjecting them to 
exclusive rights, thus helping to promote their wide accessibility. In this 
regard, a public strategy for promoting social innovations would resemble 
federal funding of basic scientific research, the fruits of which are 
generally available in the public domain.
292
 This approach reduces 
deadweight losses associated with exclusive rights and has progressive 
distributional effects where social innovations are funded from general tax 
revenues.
293
 Ultimately, “there are weighty reasons to justify government 
support [of social innovations] because they improve social performance, 
entail information spillovers and may engender future business 
innovations that otherwise would never happen.”294  
A significant number of social innovations, including the ones profiled 
previously, are completely or partially subsidized with public funds. CBT 
arose in significant part from publicly funded academic research in 
psychology and psychiatry.
295
 The Central Bank of Bangladesh provided 
early support for Grameen Bank, in which the national government still 
holds a ten percent stake.
296
 Furthermore, governmental entities such as 
the UK Department of Health have funded the dissemination of standards 
to prevent MRSA infections.
297
  
Many national governments directly fund social innovation.
298
 In the 
United States, the Obama administration created the Office of Social 
Innovation and Civic Participation, which supports a Social Innovation 
Fund administered by the Corporation for National and Community 
 
 
 292. See Arrow, supra note 140, at 623 (concluding that optimal allocation of resources to 
invention requires research financing by government or some other nonmarket agency). Although 
universities may patent the results of publicly funded, academic research under the Bayh–Dole Act, 
truly “upstream” discoveries that arise from such funding may not satisfy the requirements of 
patentability in many cases, thus remaining in the public domain. 
 293. Cf. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 264, at 345–46. 
 294. Pol & Ville, supra note 14, at 883. 
 295. See Rachman, supra note 75, at 4–22 (discussing the origins of CBT in the United States and 
United Kingdom). 
 296. A Short History of Grameen Bank, GRAMEEN BANK, http://www.grameen-info.org/index. 
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=19&Itemid=114, archived at http://perma.cc/6CER-V3S7 
(last updated July 15, 2013). 
 297. Jacob, supra note 121, at 7; see Treakle, supra note 121 at 101 (describing the UK 
Department of Health recommendations); id. at 103 (describing study results that health care workers’ 
white coats are frequently contaminated with S. aureus colonies, many of which are resistant to 
methicillin). 
 298. Governments also provide significant support for social innovations through tax incentives, 
such as tax deductions for charitable donations and tax-exempt status for nonprofit organizations. See 
generally Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 264 (comparing tax incentives, prizes, patents, and grants as 
mechanisms to promote innovation). 
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Service.
299
 The Fund was formally created by the Edward M. Kennedy 
Serve America Act, which Congress enacted in 2009.
300
 The Fund 
“combines public and private resources to grow promising community-
based solutions” in the areas of economic opportunity, health, and youth 
development.
301
 It funds several intermediary grant-making entities that 
identify promising programs in local communities. The intermediaries 
must match federal funds on a one-to-one basis, and they select local 
nonprofit organizations to receive grants and run programs. These local 
organizations are also required to match funds and submit to program 
evaluations.
302
 In its first three years, the Fund awarded $137 million in 
grants to twenty intermediary entities, which in turn awarded grants to 197 
nonprofit organizations.
303
 These organizations operate several innovative 
initiatives, from a “shared equity homeownership” program that improves 
the ability of local organizations to manage public investments in 
homeownership to an after-school soccer program that educates low-
income youth about health and nutrition.
304
 These organizations have 
committed to raising an additional $350 million in nonfederal funds to 
support their programs.
305
  
Although public funds for social innovation are helpful, the creation of 
a robust market for social capital may have even greater impact.
306
 In this 
vein, UK Prime Minister David Cameron has helped implement an 
initiative now known as Big Society Capital to “help finance social 
enterprises, charities, and voluntary groups through intermediaries.”307 
This initiative is supported by £400 million from dormant bank accounts 
and £200 million from the four largest UK banks.
308
 This novel institution 
aims to fund a variety of projects, particularly those that help the long-
 
 
 299. Social Innovation Fund, OFFICE OF SOCIAL INNOVATION AND CIVIC PARTICIPATION (2014), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/sicp/initiatives/social-innovation-fund, archived at 
http://perma.cc/U89K-WTL6. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Social Innovation Fund Grantee Overview, CORP. FOR NAT’L & CMTY. SERV. 1 (Oct. 2012), 
http://www.nationalservice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/factsheet_sifgrantees.pdf. 
 304. Id. at 1–2. 
 305. Id. at 1. 
 306. Sir Ronald Cohen, Big Society Capital Marks a Paradigm Shift, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION 
REV., Summer 2012, at 21, 21 (“Yet there is one resource—vastly bigger than the resources currently 
available to either government or the social sector—that has remained largely untapped for social 
purposes: the capital markets.”). 
 307. Let’s Hear Those Ideas, supra note 227, at 55. 
 308. Nicholas Watt, David Cameron Launches £600m ‘Big Society’ Fund, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 
3, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/society/2012/apr/04/david-cameron-big-society-fund, archived 
at http://perma.cc/7HKD-PDFP. 
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term unemployed obtain jobs.
309
 This infusion of capital will far outstrip 
the estimated £165 million that went to social investments in the previous 
year.
310
 Similar to the Obama administration’s Social Innovation Fund, 
Big Society Capital will act as a wholesaler, investing through 
intermediaries that will make subsequent grants to local organizations.
311
 
In addition to more traditional grant-making functions, Big Society Capital 
employs a social innovation of its own: Social Impact Bonds.
312
 Charitable 
organizations use these bonds to raise funds, thus allowing them to bid for 
and participate in government payment-by-results contracts. The bonds 
attract investors who are interested in accruing social in addition to 
financial returns on their investments.
313
 Big Society Capital has created 
several funds for socially innovative programs, such as one that finances 
franchise contracts to allow unemployed persons to start businesses and 
another to support disadvantaged communities seeking to reduce their 
carbon footprint.
314
 
In parallel to national governments, international organizations have a 
strong role to play in providing high-level coordination and technical 
assistance for social innovation. In 2000, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) created the Forum on Social 
Innovations to identify and disseminate social innovations and transfer 
best practices.
315
 The European Commission has funded EMUDE 
(Emerging User Demands for Sustainable Solutions), which aims “to 
explore the potential of social innovation as a driver for technological and 
production innovation, in view of sustainability.”316 It supports 
community-based, innovative solutions to social challenges.
317
 Such 
solutions include Aquarius, an innovative elderly community where 
residents help each other with basic services, as well as the 
Neighbourhood Shares program, in which residents assume responsibility 
from the city for certain public services.
318
 Ultimately EMUDE seeks to 
 
 
 309. Id. 
 310. Sarah Neville & Jonathan Moules, ‘Big Society Bank’ to Start Providing Capital, FIN. TIMES 
(Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/51466676-7d8f-11e1-bfa5-00144feab49a.html. 
 311. Cf. id. 
 312.  BIG SOCIETY CAPITAL, ANNUAL REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 2012, at 8 (2013) 
(quoting Nick O’Donohoe, Chief Executive Officer, Big Society Capital). 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. at 20. 
 315. OECD, FOSTERING INNOVATION, supra note 13, at 18. 
 316. A Digital Magazine for the Creative Communities, EMUDE CREATIVE COMMUNITIES 
(2014), http://www.sustainable-everyday-project.net/emude/2013/04/03/a-digital-magazine-for-the-
creative-communities/, archived at http://perma.cc/GK63-5TDF. 
 317. EMUDE, Final Activity Report, supra note 204, at 4. 
 318. Neighbourhood Shares, EMUDE CREATIVE COMMUNITIES (2014), http://www.sustainable-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss1/5
  
 
 
 
 
2014] SOCIAL INNOVATION 51 
 
 
 
 
support creative communities in becoming sustainable “diffused social 
enterprises.”319 
Local governments also have a strong role to play in supporting social 
innovation, particularly given the local nature of such activities. In 2006, 
New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg created the Center for 
Economic Opportunity (CEO) to invest both public and private money to 
fund social entrepreneurs.
320
 CEO funds more than 40 poverty-fighting 
initiatives, such as job-training and asset-building programs.
321
 CEO and 
the Mayor’s Fund to Advance NYC received a Social Innovation Fund 
grant from the federal Corporation for National and Community Service to 
administer antipoverty programs in and around New York City.
322
 
Additionally, the mayor of San Francisco maintains an Office of Civic 
Innovation.
323
 Among other functions, the office manages Living 
Innovation Zones, a novel initiative that helps innovators, artists, and 
designers utilize public spaces in San Francisco to demonstrate and test 
new projects.
324
  
In sum, public funding and technical assistance can play a vital role in 
supporting social innovations. As a general matter, “government grants are 
most effective when the government has a comparative advantage relative 
to the private sector in evaluating the costs and benefits of potential 
projects.”325 This is the case for social innovations, as their considerable 
value is not reflected in market prices. Although political decision making 
is subject to its own deficiencies,
326
 the political sphere is in many ways 
better situated than the market to define societal priorities in classic 
domains of social innovation such as health, education, welfare, and 
economic opportunity. The model of public funding profiled here has 
several benefits. First, as in the Social Innovation Fund and Big Society 
Capital, government support can help generate additional money from the 
private sector, thus amplifying the economic impact of taxpayer 
 
 
everyday-project.net/emude/2013/04/03/neighbourhood-shares/, archived at http://perma.cc/44L3-
P6RY. 
 319. EMUDE, Final Activity Report, supra note 204, at 22; cf. Montgomery et al., supra note 152. 
 320. N.Y.C. CTR. FOR ECON. OPPORTUNITY (2014), http://www.nyc.gov/html/ceo/html/home/ 
home.shtml; Let’s Hear Those Ideas, supra note 227, at 56. 
 321. Georges & Burke, supra note 258, at 96.  
 322. Social Innovation Fund, N.Y.C. CTR. FOR ECON. OPPORTUNITY, http://www.nyc.gov/html/ 
ceo/html/initiatives/sif.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/SZ4Z-2DDZ. 
 323. See INNOVATESF, supra note 53. 
 324. Living Innovation Zones, THE MAYOR’S OFFICE OF CIVIC INNOVATION (2014), http://liz. 
innovatesf.com/, archived at http://perma.cc/P2WG-YY4X. 
 325. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 264, at 375. 
 326. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
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assistance. Second, this model delegates final grant-making decisions to 
intermediaries, thus reducing information costs for national decision 
makers, who may not be familiar with local needs and organizations. 
While such an approach may not replicate the information cost efficiencies 
of market-based production,
327
 utilizing local knowledge offers distinct 
advantages relative to purely centralized decision making. 
Of course, public funding is subject to its own limitations. Public 
choice theory predicts that political interests may bias grant-making 
decisions; like other forms of patronage, grantors may favor grantees that 
have curried favor.
328
 Furthermore, governments are notoriously poor at 
“picking winners.” Contrary to the distributed information efficiencies of 
the market, public funding requires a centralized authority to make broad 
investment decisions with limited information. Although some of these 
information costs can be mitigated by using local intermediaries, it will 
always be difficult to assess whether government is investing in the “right” 
social innovations to the appropriate degree.
329
 Along these lines, although 
the Social Innovation Fund’s investment of $137 million over three years 
may sound impressive, it is relatively small compared to other federal 
funding priorities,
330
 and it is unclear what the optimal amount of public 
support should be. Nonetheless, public funding represents a powerful 
engine for promoting social innovation while not subjecting it to a 
counterproductive regime of exclusive rights.  
2. Inducement Prizes 
In addition to ex ante grants, prizes awarded on an ex post basis can 
powerfully promote innovative activity.
331
 So-called “inducement prizes” 
encourage contestants to achieve a specific objective and only award funds 
upon its satisfactory completion.
332
 Notably, the resulting prize-winning 
 
 
 327. See supra notes 280–82 and accompanying text. 
 328. Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP?, supra note 60, at 1440. 
 329. These limitations are potentially significant given that the quality of grant-making decisions 
will heavily impact the course of progress in a particular field. Id. 
 330. By comparison, the National Institutes of Health provides about $30.1 billion for biomedical 
research every year. See NIH Budget, NIH (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.nih.gov/about/budget.htm. 
 331. See, e.g., Pol & Ville, supra note 14, at 883 (suggesting government-awarded prizes to 
promote social innovations). 
 332. Thomas Kalil, Prizes for Technological Innovation, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE 5 (Dec. 
2006), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2006/12/healthcare%2 
0kalil/200612kalil.pdf.  
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innovation is generally subject to open access rather than exclusivity.
333
 
Inducement prizes have a long history. Throughout the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, prizes stimulated the development of a workable 
water turbine,
334
 seaworthy chronometer,
335
 and method of preserving 
food.
336
 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, European scientific 
societies routinely offered prizes for solving theoretical and applied 
problems.
337
 In a particularly famous prize from 1919, French hotelier 
Raymond Orteig offered a $25,000 prize for the first nonstop flight 
between New York and Paris; Charles Lindbergh won the prize in 1927.
338
 
Prizes like these have seen a resurgence of late. In particular, the XPRIZE 
Foundation has sponsored several high-profile competitions,
339
 and the 
World Health Organization and the World Bank have proposed prizes for 
vaccines for use primarily in the developing world.
340
 In 2009, one study 
estimated the aggregate value of the prize sector to be “as much as $1 to 2 
billion.”341 Subject to certain limitations, prizes represent a valuable 
mechanism for encouraging social innovation.
342
 
As recent experience demonstrates, government prizes have significant 
potential to promote innovative activity. For example, the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) recently sponsored a 
challenge whereby participants had to identify the exact location of ten 
 
 
 333. See Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 
44 J. L. & ECON. 525, 530 (2001) (“[T]he reward system is superior to patent in that deadweight loss 
due to monopoly pricing is avoided under rewards.”). 
 334. Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 140, at 53. 
 335. Kalil, supra note 332, at 5; Pol & Ville, supra note 14, at 883. The UK Board of Longitude 
ultimately awarded the prize to J. Harrison. Kalil, supra note 332, at 5. 
 336. Kalil, supra note 332, at 5. See also Donald E. Tepper, Contemporary Topics in Health Care: 
Crowdsourcing, PT IN MOTION, Feb. 2013, at 26, 26 (2013). Nicolas Appert won the prize in 1810 by 
developing the practice of sealing food in glass jars. Id. 
 337. Toni Feder, Incentive Prizes Reinvented to Solve Problems, PHYSICS TODAY, Nov. 2010, at 
22. 
 338. Tepper, supra note 336, at 26. 
 339. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 264, at 317; Kalil, supra note 332, at 5; Tepper, supra note 
336, at 26. 
 340. Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 140, at 55–56.  
 341. MCKINSEY & CO., “AND THE WINNER IS . . .”: CAPTURING THE PROMISE OF PHILANTHROPIC 
PRIZES 16 (2009). 
 342. Commentators have also explored creative approaches to integrating prizes within the patent 
system. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 119–21 
(2003) (providing examples). This Part focuses on inducement prizes, which provide a monetary 
reward to induce innovative activity. Recognition prizes such as the Nobel Prize (whose principal 
value is reputational rather than financial) can also motivate innovative activity. Cf. Kalil, supra note 
332, at 5; see also Innovations in American Government Awards, supra note 56 (describing a Kennedy 
School program that provides Innovation in American Government Awards).  
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large, red balloons across the United States.
343
 A team from MIT won the 
$40,000 prize by utilizing social media to complete the challenge in less 
than nine hours.
344
 Notably, the techniques used to win this challenge may 
address a wide variety of social needs, such as finding missing children, 
publicizing recalls of unsafe products, and coordinating rescue efforts 
during natural disasters.
345
 The Obama administration has taken a strong 
interest in prizes; the White House Office of Science and Technology 
Policy helps lead an initiative aimed at expediting the processes by which 
federal agencies can offer prizes.
346
 Furthermore, in September 2012, the 
federal government launched challenge.gov.
347
 Although most of the 
challenges appearing on this website are technological in nature, some 
have a more explicitly social dimension.
348
 For instance, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is sponsoring a Campus 
RainWorks challenge to encourage college students to design innovative 
stormwater management projects, thus raising awareness of green 
design.
349
 At the local level, San Francisco’s Office of Civic Innovation is 
offering inducement prizes in an initiative called ImproveSF, which is an 
online platform that “[c]onnect[s] civic challenges to community problem-
solvers.”350 Recent prizes include a “rags to revenue” challenge to develop 
a better system for repurposing excess donated textiles to benefit 
underprivileged populations.
351
 
Prizes have also seen a resurgence in the private sector, most 
prominently due to the XPRIZE Foundation. The Foundation ran the high-
profile Ansari XPRIZE, which awarded $10 million to Scaled Composites 
for developing a “spacecraft capable of carrying three people one hundred 
 
 
 343. MIT Red Balloon Team Wins DARPA Network Challenge, DARPA (Dec. 5, 2009), 
http://archive.darpa.mil/networkchallenge/darpanetworkchallengewinner2009.pdf. 
 344. Id.; A Social Network that Ballooned, MIT MEDIA RELATIONS (Dec. 11, 2009), 
http://web.mit.edu/press/2009/darpa-challenge-1210.html, archived at http://perma.cc/BV3C-GABK. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Feder, supra note 337, at 22; see Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 264, at 318 (“[B]etween 
September 2010 and September 2013, fifty-eight different federal agencies administered a total of 228 
‘challenge competitions.’”). 
 347. CHALLENGE.GOV (2012), http://challenge.gov/. 
 348. The USPTO’s Patents for Humanity program, which recognizes and rewards the use of 
patented technologies for humanitarian purposes, operates on challenge.gov. See USPTO Patents for 
Humanity, CHALLENGE POST, http://patentsforhumanity.challengepost.com/, archived at http://perma. 
cc/4MYC-LDAW; supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 349. A Partnership Between the Public and the Government to Solve Important Challenges, 
CHALLENGE.GOV (2014), https://challenge.gov/. 
 350. ImproveSF, S.F. MAYOR’S OFFICE OF CIVIC INNOVATION, INNOVATESF, http://innovatesf. 
com/projects/improvesf/. 
 351. How Can We Turn “Rags to Revenue?”, IMPROVESF (2014), http://www.improvesf.com/ 
how-can-we-turn-rags-to-revenue/, archived at http://perma.cc/M5GB-85U6. 
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kilometers above the earth’s surface, twice within two weeks.”352 Other 
prize competitions have tackled challenges with significant technological 
and social implications, such as developing fuel-efficient cars, methods of 
cleaning oil spills, vertical takeoff and landing rockets, and innovative 
approaches to genome sequencing.
353
 Additionally, a small industry has 
emerged to facilitate prizes in the public and private sectors. For example, 
InnoCentive creates online platforms for prize competitions and bills itself 
as the “global leader in crowdsourcing innovation problems to the world’s 
smartest people.”354 
Commentators have argued for government-sponsored prizes for social 
innovations when adequate market incentives do not exist.
355
 Prizes 
exhibit several informational advantages relative to traditional grant 
making. Most notably, they don’t require a sponsor to determine how a 
problem is solved or identify (on an ex ante basis) who is best situated to 
solve it.
356
 Along these lines, prizes share some of the decentralized 
information advantages of markets
357
 and can stimulate nontraditional 
participants with fresh ideas who would not normally vie for public 
grants.
358
 They are best suited when government entities can establish a 
clear goal and an appropriate prize size (or a clear metric for calculating 
the prize size) but may not be able to identify the most promising means to 
achieve the goal on an ex ante basis.
359
 Furthermore, prizes avoid the 
incentive in grant-making systems of potential grantees overpromising on 
what they can deliver, as participants will only receive a prize if they are 
the first to solve a challenge.
360
 Finally, prizes often stimulate additional 
philanthropic and private investment to augment the cash value of the 
prize.
361
 There is a further “multiplier” effect in that prizes encourage 
parallel efforts to provide solutions by multiple participants, which can far 
outstrip the value of the cash purse. 
 
 
 352. Ansari XPRIZE, XPRIZE FOUNDATION (2011), http://space.xprize.org/ansari-x-prize, 
archived at http://perma.cc/ER5L-DHLS. 
 353. Id. Outside of the XPRIZE Foundation, other entities have also sponsored prizes geared more 
specifically toward social innovation. See, e.g., ASIA SOCIAL INNOVATION AWARD, http://www.social 
innovationaward.asia/; Dell Social Innovation Challenge, DELL, http://www.dell.com/learn/us/en/ 
uscorp1/corp-comm/cr-social-innovation-competition.  
 354. What We Do, INNOCENTIVE (2013), http://www.innocentive.com/about-innocentive, 
archived at http://perma.cc/3JSJ-G9GY; see Brown & Wyatt, supra note 191, at 34. 
 355. Pol & Ville, supra note 14, at 885. 
 356. Kalil, supra note 332, at 6. 
 357. Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 118, at 1954. 
 358. Kalil, supra note 332, at 7. 
 359. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 264, at 376. 
 360. Kalil, supra note 332, at 6–7. 
 361. Id. at 7. 
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However, inducement prizes are subject to certain limitations. As with 
direct government funding, they require an entity to determine, through 
nonmarket mechanisms, what innovations to pay for and how much to 
spend.
362
 They also require a sponsor to precisely define a goal as well as 
the rules of a challenge.
363
 There is of course a possibility that decision-
making boards will make mistakes both with defining a challenge and 
selecting a winner.
364
 Prizes involve significant risk on the part of 
participants;
365
 it is possible that one will invest significantly in trying to 
win a prize but ultimately receive nothing.
366
 Oftentimes, participants end 
up spending more money on their solutions than the prize award, thus 
requiring outside fundraising.
367
 And, of course, the multiplier effect of 
prizes, which can be beneficial from one perspective, also represents 
duplicative and potentially wasteful effort.
368
 Prizes may be inapposite for 
many kinds of social innovations that do not resemble discrete 
technologies, such as a spacecraft, which a prize winner can simply hand 
off to a sponsor. As noted, many social innovations involve long-term 
behavioral change, monitoring, and maintenance.
369
 Prizes are best suited 
for “pie in the sky” leaps in innovation370 and may be too tenuous to 
satisfy immediate human needs for health, shelter, and social services. 
Prize sponsors also face the challenge of determining the “right” size of 
an award. While it is typically assumed that is done on an ex ante basis, 
this need not be the case. Recent proposals to structure prizes have focused 
on tying the size of the prize award to measurable metrics, such as sales of 
some new technology.
371
 Although this may be inapposite for social 
innovations that do not aim for market impact, prize sponsors may apply 
this intuition by calibrating the size of the award to some desirable (and 
measurable) metric, such as number of people served or improvements in 
health outcomes for a target population.  
 
 
 362. Cf. Kapczynski, supra note 9, at 986. 
 363. Feder, supra note 337, at 22; Kalil, supra note 332, at 6; Robb Mandelbaum, The X Factor, 
DISCOVER, Feb. 2009, at 50. 
 364. Pol & Ville, supra note 14, at 883. 
 365. Id. 
 366. Kalil, supra note 332, at 7. 
 367. Feder, supra note 337, at 23. 
 368. Kalil, supra note 332, at 7. 
 369.  See supra notes 214–26 and accompanying text. 
 370. Cf. Mandelbaum, supra note 363, at 53 (quoting William Whittaker, Carnegie Mellon 
University). 
 371. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 264, at 332; Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 118, at 1955. 
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3. Crowdfunding 
Funding is critical to enabling social innovation, but it need not come 
from traditional grants or prizes. Myriad financing models abound. For 
instance, traditional charitable donations continue to play an important 
role in funding social innovations.
372
 Additionally, the Internet boom of 
the 1990s spawned a new generation of “venture philanthropists” who 
have committed substantial funds to early-stage, innovative endeavors.
373
 
Recently, more diverse and sophisticated financing models have emerged 
as well.
374
 One prominent example is crowdfunding, in which social 
entrepreneurs (and, indeed, entrepreneurs of all kinds) seek funding from 
the public at large. Crowdfunding has even attracted significant policy 
attention; in 2012, President Obama signed the JOBS (Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups) Act, which relaxes securities regulations to encourage 
crowdfunded investments.
375
 
Entrepreneurs have utilized crowdfunding to finance a wide variety of 
projects, including social innovations. The most prominent crowdfunding 
(or “micropatronage”) site is Kickstarter,376 which was founded in 2009 
and has raised over $20 million for projects from books
377
 to scientific 
research.
378
 A slew of subject-specific crowdfunding sites
379
 have sprung 
up, such as the Open Source Science Project
380
 and SciFlies,
381
 which fund 
scientific and technological research, and RocketHub, which funds artists 
and entrepreneurs.
382
 Additionally, several crowdfunding sites have a 
 
 
 372. Certainly, policy makers should not neglect the power of old-fashioned charitable giving. Cf. 
Leadbeater, supra note 6, at 9 (“Gifts can create and convey emotional bonds and relationships [that] 
transactions do not.”). 
 373. See Jacobson, supra note 190. Along somewhat related lines, the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation plays a particularly important role in philanthropic giving, especially in the realm of global 
health. See GRAND CHALLENGES IN GLOBAL HEALTH (2003–13), http://www.grandchallenges. 
org/Pages/BrowseByGoal.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/833U-MZR9. 
 374. BIG SOCIETY CAPITAL, supra note 312, at 12. 
 375. Harry McCracken, The Kickstarter Economy, TIME, Oct. 1, 2012, at 32, 34; Erik A. 
Christiansen, Obama Signs Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act into Law, SEC. LITIG. J., Spring 2012, 
at 22. 
 376. Emily Gould, Start Me Up, TECH. REV., Jan./Feb. 2011, at 76; see McCracken, supra note 
375, at 32. 
 377. Gould, supra note 376, at 76. 
 378. Jim Giles, Finding Philanthropy: Like It? Pay for It, 481 NATURE 252, 252 (2012). 
 379. As of February 2012, Funding Launchpad reported there were 138 crowdfunding sites in the 
United States. McCracken, supra note 375, at 36. 
 380. About Us, THE OPEN SOURCE SCIENCE PROJECT, http://www.theopensourcescienceproject. 
com/aboutus.php, archived at http://perma.cc/VRL2-23QG; Giles, supra note 378, at 252. 
 381. SCIFLIES (2014), http://sciflies.org/, archived at http://perma.cc/Z4S6-F3UY. 
 382. Giles, supra note 378, at 253; ROCKETHUB (2014), http://www.rockethub.com/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/X68E-EVKW. 
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public-interest focus. For example, Kiva is a website that allows 
individuals to lend small amounts to individuals in low- and middle-
income countries, many of whom use these funds for entrepreneurial 
activities.
383
 Between 2005 and 2012, over 600,000 lenders provided about 
$275 million in loans on the website.
384
 Furthermore, Citizinvestor allows 
municipalities to solicit funds for public projects that have languished 
because of lack of money,
385
 and Givezooks! is a crowdfunding site aimed 
at nonprofits.
386
 Micropatronage provides another promising mechanism to 
fund social innovations. 
Although it shows potential, there are certainly downsides to 
crowdfunding. The market (in theory) allocates resources efficiently based 
on economic value, and government (in theory) allocates resources based 
on some estimation of social value. However, crowdfunding has attracted 
criticism as allocating resources based on trendiness and consumer 
whim.
387
 In a broader sense, the “wisdom of crowds” that represents one 
of crowdfunding’s perceived virtues may prove to be illusory,388 as “sexy” 
projects that are presented in a hip, engaging way tend to do well on 
crowdfunding sites.
389
 Furthermore, entrepreneurs can become beholden to 
investors,
390
 chasing and appeasing them in ways that distract from 
providing innovative social services. Additionally, crowdfunding works 
best for projects that have a definitive end rather than long-term projects 
that serve intractable social needs, and the total amount of money 
disbursed thus far has been relatively small.
391
 Despite these limitations, 
crowdfunding can play a valuable role in a multiprong strategy to promote 
social innovation. 
 
 
 383. How Kiva Works, KIVA (2014), http://www.kiva.org/about/how, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
RP5Y-XNXS. 
 384. Giles, supra note 378, at 253. Notably, Kiva is a forum for lending rather than donation, 
which is more typical of crowdfunding sites.  
 385. CITIZINVESTOR (2014), http://www.citizinvestor.com/; Noreen Malone, Fund Me, I’m 
Useless: Kickstarter’s Empty Promise, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 6, 2012, at 8; Breaking Ground: Online 
Start-Ups Are Rallying Citizens to Revamp Their Neighbourhoods, ECONOMIST, May 18, 2013. 
 386. GIVEZOOKS! (2014), https://www.givezooks.com/; Rob Tornoe, Alternative Funding: What 
You Need to Know Before Outsourcing Your Business Model, EDITOR & PUBLISHER (May 13, 2013), 
http://www.editorandpublisher.com/Features/Article/Alternative-Funding--What-You-Need-to-Know-
Before-Outsourcing-Your-Business-Model, archived at http://perma.cc/6GHZ-AJTB. 
 387. See, e.g., Malone, supra note 385, at 8 (describing a proposal for a giant RoboCop statue that 
raised $67,436 on Kickstarter). 
 388. Cf. id. 
 389. Cf. Giles, supra note 378, at 253 (suggesting that crowdfunding for scientific research may 
only work for “sexy” projects). 
 390. Gould, supra note 376, at 77.  
 391.  See id. at 76 (reporting that the leading crowdfunding site, Kickstarter, has raised 
approximately $20 million). 
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C. Infrastructure, Networks, and Incubators 
Public and private entities can accelerate social innovation by 
providing infrastructure in addition to funding. In particular, they can play 
an important role in facilitating the networks and communal interaction 
that drive social innovation.
392
 Relationships matter a great deal in social 
innovation, as they serve as the primary conduits for obtaining 
knowledge.
393
 Not surprisingly, innovative communities often exhibit 
close relationships among their members.
394
 In addition to helping create 
social innovations, networks are also important for disseminating them.
395
 
Social interaction represents “a sophisticated interface that provides the 
user with access to knowledge from individual social members and, 
through extension, to a variety of information systems” to help adopt a 
new practice.
396
 According to Trisha Greenhalgh and her colleagues, 
innovation adoption by individuals “is powerfully influenced by the 
structure and quality of their social networks.”397 This is particularly 
evident in the dissemination of CBT, which proceeded through 
professional and policy networks.
398
 
One of the reasons that networks are so important for generating and 
spreading social innovations is because of their highly tacit nature.
399
 A 
recent strand of IP literature has examined the importance of tacit, 
uncodified knowledge in transferring patented technologies from one 
entity to another. As I and others have explored, even when an invention is 
formally disclosed in a patent, much invention-related tacit knowledge 
remains undisclosed in the inventor’s mind, and this tacit knowledge can 
 
 
 392. Allen Foster, A Nonlinear Model of Information-Seeking Behavior, 55 J. AM. SOC. FOR INFO. 
SCI. & TECH 228, 229 (2004); Nicola Morelli, Social Innovation and New Industrial Contexts: Can 
Designers “Industrialize” Socially Responsible Solutions?, DESIGN ISSUES, Autumn 2007, at 3, 11; 
see generally HARGADON, supra note 145, at 5–6 (describing the importance of networks in 
innovation). 
 393. Mulgan et al., supra note 2, at 42; see Marlene J. Le Ber & Oana Branzei, (Re)Forming 
Strategic Cross-Sector Partnerships: Relational Processes of Social Innovation, 49 BUS. & SOC. 140, 
143–49 (2010) (exploring how relational processes affect social innovation in the context of nonprofit 
and for-profit partnerships). 
 394. Emil Badilescu-Buga, Knowledge Behaviour and Social Adoption of Innovation, 49 INFO. 
PROCESSING & MGMT. 902, 909 (2013). 
 395. Berwick, supra note 221, at 1974 (“Spread requires social interaction.”). 
 396. Badilescu-Buga, supra note 394, at 905. 
 397. Greenhalgh et al., supra note 202, at 601. 
 398. Mulgan, supra note 2, at 146. 
 399. Cf. Bradach, supra note 213, at 21 (noting the importance and prevalence of tacit knowledge 
in the nonprofit sector). 
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vastly accelerate the transfer and development of a new technology.
400
 In 
similar fashion, the effective spread of social innovations often requires 
transferring tacit knowledge. The “know-how” for implementing and 
spreading a social innovation resides in personal experience rather than 
documentation. In the context of educational innovations, for example, 
“[n]umerous practices remain tacit; not explicated and not articulated, 
invisible and difficult to transfer.”401 The tacitness of social innovations 
further underscores the importance of human conduits by which they 
spread. 
More broadly, the unique nature of social innovations requires 
relational avenues for their dissemination, particularly compared to the 
seemingly objectively reproducible technologies of the patent system.
402
 
As discussed above, most social innovations are not discrete, physical 
devices, but implicate changes in routines, practices, and behavior.
403
 For 
example, the true “innovation” in reducing hospital-based infections 
involves not only a novel technique of removing one’s gown into a glove 
but actually inculcating a behavioral norm of consistently applying this 
practice among busy healthcare workers. Such human and institutional 
change requires a significant amount of “laying on of hands” in the form 
of direct personal engagement, education, and social reinforcement to 
spread an innovation. Such processes are highly personal in nature and not 
reducible to merely following steps in an instructional guide. Indeed, in 
some cases transferring a social innovation requires extending a particular 
organizational culture to a new context, which is very difficult to 
accomplish in discrete, arm’s length transactions.404 
Governments and private entities can play a powerful role in enabling 
the networks that allow social innovations to coalesce and spread. After 
all, “bottom-up” social innovations, particularly those that are user 
generated, can benefit substantially from “top-down” policy intervention 
and support.
405
 For example, EMUDE, which is an initiative of the 
European Commission, provides enabling platforms such as “systems of 
 
 
 400. See, e.g., Lee, Tacit Dimension, supra note 138; Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in 
Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1009, 1014–16 (2008). 
 401. DOMINIQUE FORAY & JULIO RAFFO, ÉCOLE POLYTECHNIQUE FÉDÉRALE DE LAUSANNE, A 
SMALL EXPLOSION: PATENT IN EDUCATIONAL AND INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES AND METHODS; 
WHAT DO THEY TELL US? 9 (Sept. 24–25 2009), available at http://www.epip.eu/conferences/ 
epip04/files/FORAY_ Dominique.pdf; see also Foray & Hargreaves, supra note 143, at 13. 
 402. See supra Part II.E.  
 403.  See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text. 
 404. See Bradach, supra note 213, at 20–21. 
 405. Cf. EMUDE, Final Activity Report, supra note 204, at 7. 
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technologies, infrastructures, legal frameworks, and modes of governance 
and policy making”406 for social innovations. It has established a network 
of observers, called Antennas, at eight European design schools to help 
identify and share information on new practices.
407
 In this manner, 
EMUDE plays the role of a “signal amplifier” for social innovations 
throughout Europe.
408
 Governments can also provide infrastructure such as 
citizens’ agencies, collective spaces, and multiuser resources, such as 
payment schemes, that can aid a wide variety of social enterprises.
409
 
Additionally, private efforts to support and formalize networks can also 
promote social innovation. For example, Ashoka represents a global 
network of social entrepreneurs that provides start-up financing, 
professional services, and connections for its members.
410
  
In a more concentrated fashion, social incubators are leveraging the 
power of proximity and knowledge exchange to promote social 
innovations. A wide literature has developed on the importance of 
“agglomeration economies” such as Silicon Valley, where the close 
proximity of firms in high-tech industries facilitates rapid dissemination of 
knowledge and collective technological advancement.
411
 Similarly, 
infrastructure in the form of social enterprise hubs, business parks, and 
more formalized networks may speed the development and dissemination 
of social innovations.
412
 For example, the Global Social Benefit Incubator 
at Santa Clara University and Project Momentum, sponsored by ESADE 
Business School and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, provide training, 
resources, and networking opportunities for new social ventures.
413
 
Additionally, Panzanzee, a social enterprise incubator in Chicago, fosters 
co-working and communal interactions.
414
 These incubators can promote 
the networks and connections that drive social innovation. 
 
 
 406. Id. at 11, 16. 
 407. Id. at 2. 
 408. Id. 
 409. Id. at 25. At a more foundational level, legal constructs like the nonprofit corporate form and 
tax exempt status for charitable organizations also represent “infrastructure” that ultimately helps 
promote social innovations. Cf. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 264, at 353 (discussing tax incentives 
that help benefit Wikipedia). 
 410. ASHOKA INNOVATORS FOR THE PUBLIC (2014), https://www.ashoka.org/; see Bornstein, 
supra note 202; William Drayton, Everyone a Changemaker: Social Entrepreneurship’s Ultimate 
Goal, INNOVATIONS, Winter 2006, at 80. 
 411. See, e.g., ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE 79 (2013); Lee, Tacit Dimension, supra 
note 138, at 1536–39. 
 412. Leadbeater, supra note 6, at 10. 
 413. Casasnovas & Bruno, supra note 43, at 175. 
 414. Anne Field, One-Stop Incubators Hatching Social Enterprise Startups, FORBES (Apr. 20, 
2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/annefield/2012/04/20/one-stop-incubators-hatching-social-enterprise-
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D. Organizational Extension and the Theory of the Firm 
Beyond networks, sometimes the best mechanism for spreading a 
social innovation is to expand the capabilities of an existing organization. 
This illustrates another significant difference between social innovations 
and patent law’s conception of protectable innovation. As discussed 
above, many aspects of patent law—such as assigning individual exclusive 
rights in inventions, requiring robust disclosure, and emphasizing discrete 
claiming—aim to make patented technologies more easily tradable in 
markets.
415
 In the classic formulation, markets not only motivate the 
generation of new technologies, they also help disseminate them.
416
 
Markets help transfer technologies from one producer to another, such as 
when a biotechnology firm licenses a patent to a pharmaceutical company 
for further development. Markets also help transfer technologies from 
producers to end consumers, such as when that pharmaceutical firm sells a 
patented drug to a patient. This model, of course, works best for discrete, 
“packageable” technologies that do not require a high degree of 
information exchange for intermediate or end users to adopt.
417
 This model 
does not work well for many social innovations, which require more 
intensive information exchange and personal interactions for 
dissemination and adoption. 
The theory of the firm sheds useful light on the challenges of spreading 
social innovations. This literature generally contrasts two archetypes for 
organizing production of some output: market-based processes, in which 
specialized firms create inputs and sell them to downstream firms that 
create finished products, and vertical integration, in which the “upstream” 
and “downstream” functions of production are integrated within individual 
firms.
418
 Ronald Coase’s central insight was that transaction costs explain 
the existence of integrated firms; in some cases, the transaction costs of 
integrating production within a single firm are lower than the transaction 
costs of market-based production.
419
 While Coase and others highlighted 
“classic” transaction costs such as the expense of finding contracting 
parties, negotiating agreements, and contending with strategic behavior,
420
 
 
 
startups/; PANZANZEE (2014), http://panzanzee.com/. 
 415. See supra Parts II.B–II.D; Lee, Tacit Dimension, supra note 138, at 1510–18. 
 416.  See Kieff, supra note 209, at 703. 
 417.  See Lee, Tacit Dimension, supra note 138, at 1527–28. 
 418. See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Lee, Tacit 
Dimension, supra note 138, at 1541–42. 
 419. Coase, supra note 418, at 390. 
 420.  See, e.g., id. at 390–93. 
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other costs can also stymie market-based transactions, particularly for 
social innovations. Even assuming that classic transaction costs are low, 
an effective program to combat MRSA infections cannot simply be 
purchased “off the shelf” in an arm’s-length transaction.421 The need to 
transfer tacit knowledge, inculcate long-term behavioral change, and 
overcome institutional intransigence all represent costs that complicate 
one-off market exchanges of social innovations.
422
 In order to spread a 
social innovation both to other providers as well as users, it is often 
helpful to embed that innovation in some kind of longer-term institutional 
framework.  
Accordingly, the high cost of spreading social innovations helps 
account for the more relational and organizational modes of transfer 
described above: dissemination, affiliation, and branching.
423
 Branching is 
“particularly attractive when successful implementation of the innovation 
depends on tight quality control, specific practices, knowledge that is not 
explicitly documented or readily communicated, and strong organizational 
cultures.”424 Along these lines, scholars suggest that plans “to support 
social innovation could use industrial logics to generate organizational 
structures, to capture codified and (to a certain extent) tacit knowledge, 
and to generate economy of scope.”425 Relatedly, a common mechanism 
for spreading social innovations is through organizational growth, 
franchising, and building partnerships between institutions.
426
 Thus, the 
appropriate metaphor for spreading a social innovation may not entail 
packaging a discrete technology and selling it on the market, but rather 
expanding the reach of an existing organization, allowing buds and grafts 
to take root in new contexts.  
E. Harnessing User Innovation and Commons-Based Peer Production 
Insights from user innovation and commons-based peer production 
may also accelerate social innovation. As described above, much social 
innovation is actually user generated, arising when individuals seek to 
 
 
 421.  See supra Part I.B.3. 
 422.  See Lee, Tacit Dimension, supra note 138, at 1544. 
 423. See supra notes 234–37 and accompanying text.  
 424. Dees et al., supra note 234, at 29 
 425. Morelli, supra note 392, at 15. 
 426. See Alvord et al., supra note 47, at 274 (“In some cases, expansion has taken the form of 
building a large organization to expand operations to affect hundreds of thousands of people, such as 
SEWA, Grameen Bank, and BRAC. For other initiatives, expansions have taken the form of building 
alliances with many other agencies rather than growing their own organizations.”); Bradach, supra 
note 213, at 19 (describing franchising as an effective model for growing a social enterprise). 
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solve everyday challenges.
427
 For example, the “positively deviant” 
practice of poor families in Vietnam serving shrimp, crabs, and snails to 
their children led to better health outcomes.
428
 Again, the model of 
innovation here is very different from that of the patent system, for at least 
two reasons. First, user innovation arises not because of exogenous profit 
incentives, but from individuals’ endogenous motivations to solve their 
own life challenges.
429
 Second, innovation here emphasizes identifying 
and spreading solutions that users have already generated rather than 
formally devoting resources to create something new.
430
 Public and private 
entities should devote more resources to scanning communities of practice 
to ascertain beneficial innovations that can be brought to scale.
431
 Just as 
“crowds” can be rich sources of funding,432 they can be rich sources of 
innovations themselves. The Internet can be a powerful tool in identifying 
and spreading these innovations. For example, several government 
agencies are using IdeaScale to gather ideas from employees and citizens 
to improve services and policy.
433
 
Lessons for accelerating social innovation also arise from commons-
based peer production, which has received significant attention in the IP 
realm.
434
 As illustrated in the development of open-source software, peer 
production is “radically decentralized, collaborative, and nonproprietary; 
based on sharing resources and outputs among widely distributed, loosely 
connected individuals who cooperate with each other without relying on 
either market signals or managerial commands.”435 Initiatives that harness 
commons-based production to serve the public good may constitute social 
innovations, such as Wikipedia, the user-generated, Internet-based 
encyclopedia.
436
 Such production promotes both efficiency and 
widespread distribution, as the fruits of such initiatives are generally 
 
 
 427. See supra notes 202–05 and accompanying text.  
 428. See supra notes 191–97 and accompanying text.  
 429.  See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
 430.  See supra notes 198–201 and accompanying text. 
 431. Cf. Berwick, supra note 221, at 1973 (proposing that health care institutions formally devote 
resources to scanning the literature and attending conferences to ascertain novel practices). 
 432.  See supra Part III.B.3. 
 433. Open Government, IDEASCALE (2014), http://ideascale.com/gov/.  
 434. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 59–90 (2006) [hereinafter BENKLER, 
NETWORKS]; Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 
369 (2002) [hereinafter Benkler, Linux]; Michael J. Madison et al., Constructing Commons in the 
Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657 (2010); Kapczynski, supra note 9, at 990. 
 435. BENKLER, NETWORKS, supra note 434, at 60. 
 436. See Kapczynski, supra note 9, at 973 (describing Wikipedia as an example of a commons-
based approach to cultural production). 
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broadly accessible.
437
 Another example of socially valuable peer 
production is the Audubon Society’s Christmas Bird Count, which enlists 
volunteers to identify, count, and report the birds they see, thus serving the 
social good.
438
 Similarly, the reCAPTCHA security feature on many Web 
registration forms, in which users type words appearing in an image, is 
actually part of a worldwide effort to digitize books and other content.
439
 
Notably, as in many areas of social innovation, commentators have 
recognized the importance of strong, charismatic leaders to coordinate 
“peer” production.440 As seen in these examples, government and private 
entities can again play important roles in fostering commons-based peer 
production to serve the social good. 
More ambitiously, the aggregation of independent but parallel social 
innovations creates enormous potential for social transformation. As 
EMUDE recognizes, “there exists a new form of creativity: a diffused 
creativity put co-operatively into action by ‘non-specialised’ people.”441 It 
goes on to recognize “the concept of diffused social enterprise (DSE), as 
the evolution of creative communities in more mature and lasting forms of 
social organization.”442 The diffused social enterprise represents a more 
macroscopic, stable, sustainable version of local creative communities.
443
 
In sum, through funding, sharing information, providing technical 
assistance, and sponsoring forums for communities to coalesce, public and 
private entities can play an important role in harnessing distributed 
activities on a mass scale to promote the public interest. 
* * * 
The challenges of the contemporary era, from education to eldercare, 
demand new social innovations.
444
 Once policy makers and business 
leaders began to appreciate the social and economic importance of 
technological innovation, they supported it with large-scale public 
funding, corporate and university research departments, and systematic 
testing of new ideas.
445
 Social innovation has yet to undergo a similar 
 
 
 437. Id. at 1000–01. 
 438. Tepper, supra note 336, at 28. In 2011, 62,624 observers counted 61,359,451 birds in North 
and South America. Id. 
 439. Id. 
 440. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP?, supra note 60, at 1453–54. 
 441. EMUDE, Final Activity Report, supra note 204, at 3 (emphasis omitted). 
 442. Id. at 4. 
 443. Id. at 5. 
 444. See Mulgan, supra note 2, at 159. 
 445. Id.  
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revolution of recognition,
446
 and the time is ripe for such a revolution to 
begin. Exclusive rights would be a poor strategy for promoting social 
innovation, but public and private entities can do much to accelerate this 
important domain of human creativity. Grants and social capital markets 
can provide the necessary financial resources to drive social innovation 
without subjecting it to a counterproductive regime of exclusive rights. 
Prizes may be particularly well suited for discrete, ambitious social 
challenges for which a prescribed solution does not exist. Crowdfunding 
may be useful for early-stage social innovations as long as more reliable 
funds are available to address pressing needs. Governments and private 
entities can also promote social innovation through providing enabling 
infrastructure and fostering networks and incubators. At a theoretical level, 
proponents of social innovation should look beyond market models of 
dissemination to explore extending existing organizational capacities. 
Finally, public and private entities can scan the prior art for user 
innovation and coordinate peer production to serve the public interest. In 
this manner, supporting social innovation will not only serve immediate 
public needs, it will also lead to a more innovative society. 
IV. TOWARD A MORE HOLISTIC FRAMEWORK FOR INNOVATION LAW AND 
POLICY  
This Part builds upon the previous discussion to contribute to a more 
holistic framework for innovation law and policy, both in its objectives 
and the means employed to accomplish them. One aspect of this project 
involves drawing upon social innovation to strengthen efforts to promote 
more “traditional” technological innovation. More broadly, this project 
requires that innovation law and policy adopt a more capacious 
understanding of innovation, one that spans social, technological, 
utilitarian, and distributive values.  
A. Enhancing Technological Innovation in Light of Social Innovation 
Although proponents of social innovation can learn much from 
intellectual property law and efforts to promote traditional technology, the 
reverse is true, too. Attempts to promote technological innovation can 
certainly benefit from the insights of social innovation. This should not be 
surprising given that there is no bright line separating these two domains 
 
 
 446. Cf. id. 
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of innovation;
447
 these labels simply reflect differences in focus within the 
general realm of creative activity. While patents play an important role in 
generating and disseminating new technologies, a more holistic conception 
of innovation can lead to a broader suite of policy tools for promoting 
technological progress.  
To begin, this study reveals the deeply communal nature of innovation, 
both technological and social. Although patent law’s project of assigning 
individual property rights obscures this reality, federal and local 
technology policy should more explicitly support the networks and 
agglomeration economies that facilitate communal innovation.
448
 One 
clear policy proposal is to foster technological districts such as Silicon 
Valley and the Research Triangle area in North Carolina, which some 
localities have attempted with varying degrees of success.
449
 At a more 
local level, “boundary-spanning” entities play a crucial role in transferring 
technical knowledge between diverse realms.
450
 For example, technology 
transfer offices (TTOs) at universities can play a stronger role in bridging 
institutional and cultural gaps between academia and industry,
451
 thus 
driving communal progress. In terms of bridging communities, 
government can play a salutary role by fostering interdisciplinary research, 
which is often the fount of new breakthroughs.
452
 As an example in this 
regard, the National Institutes of Health has created an interdisciplinary 
facility to perform neuroscience research,
453
 thus bringing together diverse 
expertise. 
A related policy intervention involves government-sponsored 
infrastructure around which innovative efforts can coalesce. Broad, 
enabling resources such as the Internet, interface protocols, and communal 
assets such as GenBank (an open-access database of nucleotide 
 
 
 447.  See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 448.  See Lee, Tacit Dimension, supra note 138, at 1536–39, 1546–47. 
 449. See Jennifer L. Croissant & Laurel Smith-Doerr, Organizational Contexts of Science: 
Boundaries and Relationships Between University and Industry, in THE HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY STUDIES 691, 694 (Edward J. Hackett et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007). 
 450.  See Lee, Tacit Dimension, supra note 138, at 1561. 
 451. Id. at 1561–62. 
 452. Pedraza-Farina, supra note 163, at 838–39 (“[D]iscovery is inherently relational, emerging 
from a complex, interactive back-and-forth among researchers, often in different communities of 
practice or social worlds.”). 
 453. Carla Garnett, Final Part of Bldg. 35, ‘Porter II’ Nears Groundbreaking, NIH REC., Aug. 20, 
2010, at 1, 6, available at http://nihrecord.od.nih.gov/newsletters/2010/08_20_2010/story1.htm; cf. 
Pedraza-Farina, supra note 163 (noting that a high proportion of significant breakthroughs are 
interdisciplinary in nature). 
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sequences)
454
 can help establish the conditions of creativity that drive 
collective innovation. Of course, a broadly enabling resource that should 
not be ignored is money. Although the patent system prides itself as a 
market-based system of technological development, such private 
innovation rests upon a broad foundation of publicly funded research.
455
 
Just as public funding can vastly accelerate social innovation, it is also 
necessary to drive technological advancement. 
Finally, this study of social innovation reveals that the true value of 
innovation often lies not so much in invention but in implementation, 
replication, and extension.
456
 This parallels empirical accounts of 
technological development, in which invention still left significant 
technical challenges to be solved. As such, a legal and regulatory 
framework dedicated to promoting technological innovation should 
address these important considerations. In this regard, commentators have 
suggested “commercialization patents” and “innovation warrants” to help 
encourage the transition from invention to commercial product.
457
 Federal 
funding for development and translational research can also help promote 
more valuable “downstream” development and dissemination.  
B.  Pluralizing Conceptions of Innovation and Serving Distributive Values 
In addition to augmenting patent law’s narrow conception of 
innovation, this Article also seeks to pluralize the values that 
contemporary innovation law and policy serves. In ways both subtle and 
explicit, current innovation law and policy is heavily oriented toward 
satisfying market needs. Patents represent governmental interference with 
the market, but they do so under the guise of “correcting” market failure, 
thus shoring up incentives to invent. The resulting generation and 
distribution of technology is perceived to be the ineluctable consequence 
of natural forces. Relatedly, the framing of patents as property rights 
further undergirds a conception of the patent system—and the portfolio of 
technologies it helps produce—as the “natural” result of initial 
 
 
 454. GenBank Overview, NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECH. INFO. (2014), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
genbank/. 
 455. See, e.g., Peter Lee, Contracting to Preserve Open Science: Consideration-Based Regulation 
in Patent Law, 58 EMORY L.J. 889, 975 (2009); Lee, Distributive Commons, supra note 9. 
 456. Cf. Gardner et al., supra note 224 at 1052 (“[Innovation] encompasses the entire process—
from idea to implementation—for new products, services, processes, practices, and policies.”).  
 457. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.  
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entitlements coupled with voluntary transactions.
458
 But this system is far 
from neutral. Most obviously, the market utilizes ability to pay rather than 
human need, moral desert, or other criteria to ration technology, meaning 
that many innovations will be inaccessible to low-income populations. 
More substantively, the market neither captures nor reflects the full social 
value of innovations. 
Markets do not only apply value-laden criteria to select who gets 
existing innovations, they also determine the kinds of innovations that 
society develops in the first place. Not surprisingly, markets select for 
innovations that are valued in markets.
459
 Such a system is unlikely to 
allocate significant resources toward innovations of great social value but 
low market value, such as those that primarily address the needs of the 
poor.
460
 Furthermore, the market is poorly situated to generate innovations 
arising from diffuse, communal origins where it is difficult to identify and 
remunerate individual owners who contribute value.
461
 This Article’s 
analysis of social innovations is thus inseparably intertwined with a 
distributive critique of market-oriented, patent-based innovation.
462
 Such a 
system works fairly well for a discrete slice of technological innovation, 
but it largely ignores an important realm of innovation that serves 
substantive needs of underprivileged populations. 
Patent law is a cultural artifact. It is in some measure an indication of 
the types of innovations—and innovative processes—that a society deems 
valuable. IP scholars warn that policy makers should be wary of the “if 
value, then right” fallacy;463 just because a creation is valuable does not 
mean it should be subject to intellectual property rights.
464
 Conversely, 
policy makers should be wary of the “if right, then value” fallacy; just 
 
 
 458. See Harry First, Controlling the Intellectual Property Land Grab: Protect Innovation, Not 
Innovators, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 365, 370 (2007) (“Indeed, there is a long history of proponents of greater 
protection for such products using the word ‘property’ to legitimize their arguments.”). 
 459.  See supra notes 12–13. 
 460. See Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing 
Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1051 (2005) (“A mere ten 
percent of the world’s expenditure on R&D is devoted to conditions that cause ninety percent of the 
global disease burden . . . .”); cf. LOBEL, supra note 411, at 254 (“As a society, we value progress in 
areas such as health, education, research, equality, art, and science that is not reflected solely in the 
dollar value of the immediate transactions that occur in the market.”). 
 461. Cf. Benkler, Linux, supra note 434. 
 462. See Kapczynski, supra note 9, at 999 (“[D]istributive justice plausibly demands not just fair 
distribution of information goods but also equitable production of information goods.”). 
 463. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi 
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 405 (1990) (describing the emergence of the “if value, then 
right” rationale in trademark law). 
 464. See, e.g., id.; Peter Lee & Madhavi Sunder, Design Patents: Law Without Design, 17 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 277, 298 (2013). 
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because some creations are subject to exclusive rights does not mean that 
those that are freely available lack value. In fact, innovations that fall 
outside the patent paradigm may be incredibly valuable and deserving of 
public and private support. Carol Rose once observed that the common 
law of first possession reflects “the articulation of a specific vocabulary 
within a structure of symbols understood by a commercial people.”465 In 
similar fashion, the contemporary innovation law and policy framework—
of which patent law constitutes a significant part—reflects a commercially 
oriented conception of value. While this is an important kind of innovation 
with significant implications for economic and social welfare, a holistic 
legal and policy framework must go further to promote forms of 
innovation beyond the patent paradigm that serve other values as well. 
CONCLUSION 
Although a smartphone is clearly an important innovation, so is a novel 
strategy for reducing hospital-based infections. This Article has broken 
new ground by exploring the underappreciated phenomenon of social 
innovation. Rather than offer a crisp definition of social innovation, this 
Article argues that it is best understood by its distinguishing 
characteristics. Social innovations, such as CBT, microfinance, and 
strategies to reduce nosocomial infections, aim to enhance social welfare, 
are generally intended for wide distribution, and seek to change individual 
and institutional behavior. They often address the gaps left by market and 
political limitations and are distributive in nature, serving the needs of the 
underprivileged. Social innovation represents an important realm of 
innovation, and it proceeds almost completely outside of patent law. 
This study of social innovation reveals the rather crabbed, 
particularistic conception of innovation embedded in patent law. Within 
the patent paradigm, protectable innovation is individualistic, discrete, 
novel, and objectively reproducible. Much social innovation, however, is 
communal, somewhat amorphous, not strictly novel, and depends 
significantly on sustained human interaction for replication and extension. 
Notably, these attributes apply to innovation dynamics more generally, 
including technological innovation that is subject to patents. Patent law’s 
project of assigning individual rights to inventions thus relies upon and 
reinforces a somewhat distorted conception of the innovative processes it 
seeks to promote. 
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Moving from the descriptive to the prescriptive, this Article has offered 
several proposals to accelerate social innovation. It cautions against 
extending exclusive rights over such creations and instead argues for more 
public and private funding of social innovation through grants, social 
capital markets, prizes, and crowdfunding. It further argues that 
governments and private entities can accelerate social innovation through 
providing enabling infrastructure and fostering organizational strategies of 
dissemination, user-generated creativity, and commons-based peer 
production.  
At a more fundamental level, this Article has argued for a more 
comprehensive, holistic framework for innovation law and policy. It 
contends that policy makers should recognize and account for the narrow 
way in which patent law conceives of innovation. Although exclusive 
rights represent a powerful tool for promoting technological progress, 
policy makers in the public and private sectors should also promote 
creative communities, provide enabling infrastructure, and prioritize 
implementation, replication, and extension of existing innovations. 
Furthermore, this Article has argued for an innovation law and policy 
framework more sensitive to interests beyond market value, such as 
distributive equity. Through applying these lessons, public and private 
parties can transcend the patent paradigm to promote a more vibrant, 
multifaceted approach to innovation that serves all of society’s diverse 
needs. Innovation, after all, is an inherently social enterprise. 
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